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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the welfare state and social pacts and determines both
the causes for their decline and the political effects of their erosion in a series of three
papers. Though each of these papers stands alone, together they speak to the growing
influence of the European Union, which I find has been a catalyst for retrenchment
and diminished social pacts in the aftermath of the Eurozone Crisis. Furthermore, it
has been an underestimated factor in the contemporary spike in support for radical
right parties. In an era where unpopular policies are imposed by governments under
pressure from supranational entities, this volume answers the question of how the
public responds to and perceives these changes. Importantly, this dissertation finds
that there are two distinct national models for how the public responds to unpopular
policies and ultimately the distinction between these two models is whether or not the
public rewards parties for past performance or simply punishes them for unpopular
policies. This volume sheds light on a political world where austerity is the consensus
policy and national governments are constrained by supranational politics.
The first paper presents an experimental design testing how the policy evaluations
of people in Sweden and the U.K. are influenced by partisan cues. I develop the
concept of issue deficits, building and expanding upon the issue ownership literature
and behavioral economics. The results show two distinct models, with Sweden acting
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according to the issue ownership model and the U.K. acting according to my issue
deficit theory.
My second paper combines a large-N analysis of a cross-national survey with a
qualitative analysis, which demonstrates that Euroskepticism is a major independent
driver of support for radical right parties.
My third paper shows that the European Union has been a significant factor in
the decline of social pacts in Europe using a nested analysis. Pressure from the EU
can either produce negotiations or stifle them, depending on if the pressure is visible
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The Pillars of Equality in Europe
Every day evidence continues to mount about the pernicious effects of income in-
equality, making it one of the most important issues of our time. The consequences
of inequality have economic, political, and human costs. Inequality reduces economic
growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994), shrinks the middle class (Thewissen et al., 2015),
and reduces equality of opportunity by making it harder for people to transcend
the conditions of their birth (Perez-Arce et al., 2016). Politically, growing income
inequality has been connected to the ascendency of radical right parties in Europe
(Betz, 1994). Most importantly, income inequality has an awful human cost. Income
inequality is associated with higher morbidity rates (Soobader and LeClere, 1999)
and lower life expectancy (Hill, 2018; Dwyer-Lindren et al., 2017). The wide range of
negative effects of inequality and the severity of their consequences makes the study
of inequality of paramount social importance.
This work sets out to understand the countervailing forces to inequality in ad-
vanced industrialized countries and to identify what has inhibited their ability to
maintain income equality. This collection of three papers focuses on two important
political instruments that reduce income inequality: the welfare state and centralized
bargaining. Though there are other factors at work, which also play vital roles in the
level of inequality in a country (most notably the progressivity of the tax code), I
give special attention to the welfare state and industrial relations.
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The effects of the welfare state in alleviating poverty (Kenworthy, 1999) and in-
equality (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Huber et al., 1993) have
been well-established. The primacy of the left-right spectrum in organizing politics is
in part because of the centrality of social welfare in political discourse. “What do you
think about the welfare state?” has become the very center of our modern political
ideologies. Even radical right parties that primarily focus on immigration cannot
escape the gravity of the left-right economic cleavage and have framed their anti-
immigrant arguments using welfare chauvinism. Social welfare is one of the major
pillars of European politics. The Labour Party in the United Kingdom has annually
spent an average of 13.8 percent of its party platform talking about the welfare state
in 1945, with a high point of 20.6 percent of the manifesto being on welfare in 1955
(Volkens et al., 2016). When considering government spending, a staggering 45.2
percent is on social welfare (OECD, 2014). Nearly half of what the government does
is social welfare, and adjustments to a system of this scale have untold ramifications.
The centralization of collective bargaining is also crucial for income equality. Neo-
corporatism has been found to reduce inequality by creating more equal wages across
the entire economy (Wallerstein, 1999; Minnich, 2003). Neo-corporatism was com-
monly used in Western Europe for most of the 20th century, but since the 1980s
countries have decentralized their bargaining systems, leaving more room for income
inequality to set in.
Despite this decline in bargaining centralization in macro-corporatist countries,
social pacts were increasingly used in the 1990s and the early 2000s by countries
that were not seen as likely places for neo-corporatism. The Variety of Capital-
ism literature classifies these primarily southern European countries as mixed-market
economies because they do not fit with either the Liberal Market Economy or Coor-
dinated Market Economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The weakness of social partners
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prevented these countries from achieving corporatism like the Coordinated Market
Economies and they had more government intervention than the Liberal Market
Economies. Government-initiated social pacts brought together these weak social
partners in countries like Italy, Spain, and Ireland and created an ad hoc system of
centralized bargaining and policy collaboration for the social partners. Coordination
between the social partners and the government has given labor a seat at the table
and helped achieve economic targets (Perez, 2000). This emergent area was one of
the few that resisted the neoliberal tide of the 1990s.
Cracks in the Columns
The post-war accomplishments of social and Christian democratic parties have been
eroded by decades of welfare state retrenchment (Korpi and Palme, 2003). Contin-
uous progress in reducing inequality had begun to slip, even in social democratic
strongholds like Denmark and Sweden (Cingano, 2014). In many countries, replace-
ment rates for unemployment insurance and pensions were cut, making it harder for
people to make ends meet (Anderson, 2001). Even social democratic parties, who
championed these policies not long ago have participated in scaling back ambitious
social programs. In industrial relations, social pacts, once utilized to respond to crisis,
went unused during the Eurozone crisis. Instead, governments went ahead unilaterally
to impose austerity budgets that cut welfare and public sector employment. The im-
mediate response to the Great Recession was Keynesian in most European countries,
despite objections from the European Central Bank (Blyth, 2013). This early move
to Keynesian quickly shifted to austerity across the continent and the most affected
countries implemented dramatic cuts to social spending and public sector wages and
employment. Latvia fired 30 percent of public sector employees and cut the wages of
those remaining employees by 40 percent (Moulds, 2012). This was accompanied by
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cuts to services as well; pension retirement ages were increased and healthcare was
made less accessible (Moulds, 2012). Latvia was not alone in this, in fact, austerity
was the norm in Europe rather than the exception and many countries were hit hard
by the effects, famously so in Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal. This disser-
tation is a collection of three papers that sets out to understand the political causes
and consequences of this development.
Supranational Influence
Though economic policy relating to income inequality is primarily conducted at the
national level, I contend that the politics of inequality are best understood when
considering supranational forces. The European Union has become increasingly im-
portant in the domestic politics of member states. The EU can impel governments
to make sweeping reforms of their welfare systems and industrial relations, while also
allowing national governments that are pro-retrenchment to deflect blame to supra-
national entities. The pressure from the EU has constrained national politics and
this explains the convergent response from very different governments to the Euro-
zone crisis. This growing power makes the study of the European Union vital in this
moment in history.
The newfound influence of the EU comes at a time when critics have questioned
how democratic the EU is. Even before the crisis, Follessdal and Hix (2006) argued
that the EU suffered from a “democratic deficit”. Though the democratically-elected
European Parliament has gained new importance with constitutional changes prior
to the crisis, powerful executive positions within the European Commission remain
appointed and are not contested by multiple candidates. Furthermore, European elec-
tions are treated as second-order national elections, meaning that campaigns for the
European Parliament are focused on national issues rather than a European agenda
5
(Follessdal and Hix, 2006). The newfound power is accompanied with limited ac-
countability and contestation for key positions of influence.
In this context, the policies preferred by the EU officials become more impor-
tant for understanding domestic politics. The EU has used its power to implement
neoliberal policies and promoted austerity among countries struggling through the
Eurozone crisis (Sacchi, 2015; Blyth, 2013).
I argue that the power of the European Union has become increasingly politicized
and is one of the important factors explaining the rise of the radical right. Mobilizing
opposition to the EU is a key method of garnering support for the radical right. I
find that the likelihood of an anti-immigrant person voting for the radical right is
dramatically greater if that voter also opposes the European Union.
Issue Ownership and Issue Deficits
The second important thread through this dissertation is the importance of issue
politics. Traditionally, the issue ownership literature has identified that parties are
associated with certain policy areas and that is is either electorally beneficial to
emphasize them (Petrocik, 1996) or that parties are more able to enact unpopular
policies in areas they are associated with (Ross, 2000a; Kitschelt, 2001). Both of
these schools of issue ownership aggregate trust for one party and distrust of their
opponent. This approach is unable to distinguish if social democrats are trusted on
the welfare state or if right-wing parties are distrusted. This dissertation takes a
different approach and conceptualized issue ownership in a novel way. I coin the term
“issue deficits” to capture policy areas where parties have a negative reputation and
are distrusted. I retain the use of the term “issue ownership” for policy areas where
a party is trusted and has a positive reputation. The distinction between trust and
distrust is not just semantics, particularly for considerations outside of the electoral
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arena.
Imagine that a government proposes a series of welfare reforms that cuts spending
in a number of areas. The distinction between being trusted and having your op-
ponent be distrusted is incredibly important and has both practical and theoretical
implications. If a government is trusted, its reputation can improve support for the
bill or help them escape electoral consequences for unpopular actions. On the other
hand, neither of these mitigating effects occur if the opposition is distrusted on the
issue. In this second scenario, taking an unpopular stance may ruin both parties’
reputation on the issue and create new opportunities for smaller parties.
I draw on political psychology and behavioral economics to develop and concep-
tualize issue deficits. There are strong drives that motivate people to be loss averse
Kahneman et al. (1991). People tend to dislike losses more than they like gains of
a similar size.This of course explains why people would be opposed to welfare state
retrenchment in the first place; cuts to existent programs draws the public’s ire.
This negativity bias also affects how long people remember negative events. Nega-
tive political memories will last longer than positive ones (Avdagic and Savage, 2019;
Johnson-Cartee and Copeland, 1991). Avdagic and Savage (2019) found that positive
frames did not make welfare cuts more popular, which indicates that at least in some
circumstances that negativity bias is a stronger political force than positivity.
I argue that either issue ownership or issue deficits dominate retrenchment poli-
tics in different countries. National variation in the political dynamics of retrench-
ment runs contrary to many different bodies of literature and is a significant finding.
The New Politics of the Welfare State argues that the politics of retrenchment are
about blame avoidance and differences between countries can be explained by the
institutional capacity for politicians to escape blame (Pierson, 2001). While coun-
tries obviously have different outcomes with regard to retrenchment, essentially all
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wealthy countries are operating according to a single logic: blame avoidance. The
traditional issue ownership literature argues that social democrats own the welfare
state and are better able to pass retrenchment initiatives Ross (2000a). This predicts
uniform conditions applied to all members of a single party family, across liberal
democracies. Both of these influential schools of thought argue that one logic prevails
across advanced-industrial societies and the evidence that I present here calls that
into question.
Roadmap of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 uses an experimental design to identify how partisan cues affect public per-
ceptions of welfare cuts in the United Kingdom and Sweden. Survey participants were
asked to evaluate a battery of hypothetical welfare cuts, but treatment groups had
these reforms associated with different political parties. Building upon the existing
issue ownership literature that argues that parties associated with welfare state expan-
sion are better able to make cost cutting reforms because of their positive reputation
on this issue, I argue instead that reforms from parties associated with retrenchment
are punished for their “issue deficit”. The results of the experiment show each case
conformed to a different model. In the United Kingdom, the proposal attributed to
the Conservative Party was viewed less favorably than the control, as expected by
the issue deficit model. On the other hand, in Sweden, the social democrats’ proposal
was viewed more positively than the center-right proposal, corresponding to the issue
ownership model.
Chapter 3 examines the rise of the radical right in Europe. Radical right parties
have garnered newfound attention as they have reached striking distance of govern-
ment in a growing number of European countries. Most of the attention has been on
these parties’ opposition to immigration, but this neglects the importance of economic
8
issues in their platform. Much has been made of the working-class support for radical
right parties, but it has too often been taken for granted that these voters are deciding
purely on the immigration issue. Welfare chauvinism and Euroskepticism have been
an important part of the radical right’s appeal. I utilize a multinomial logistic model
to predict support for radical right parties across ten western European countries.
Notably, this approach enables the paper to differentiate between supporters of the
center-left, center-right, and radical right instead of aggregating the centrist parties
together. The results notably show that Euroskepticism and opposition to economic
inequality are statistically significant predictors of support for the radical right. I
find that the success of the radical right in garnering the support of the working-class
can be partially attributed to their support for its economic policies regarding the
welfare state and the European Union. Furthermore, Euroskepticism is not simply a
manifestation of anti-immigrant values, and this paper finds that its significant effect
is independent from the public’s attitudes toward immigrants.
Chapter 4 examines the causes of social pact decline in Europe. The pressures of
joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have been frequently identified as
a motivation for the resurgence of social pacts between labor, business and govern-
ment in the 1990s. Social pacts enabled governments to control wage-inflation and
meet the Maastricht criteria. Pacts became frequent and regular in many countries
since that period to implement incomes policies or structural reforms. However, in
the midst of the Eurozone crisis, countries that had relied on social pacts for decades
opted instead for unilateral action despite the fact that social pacts were one of the
few remaining macroeconomic tools available to national governments. Using a nested
analysis, combining a large-n quantitative analysis with a pair of case studies, this
chapter finds that while the euro drove the initial surge in social pacts, it now inhibits
them. I find that Italy did have more liberty to exercise autonomy because it was
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not under formal memorandum of understanding with the Troika. This resulted in
increased negotiations with the social partners, however, ultimately the negotiations
crumbled because of pressure from the EU. Furthermore, the case studies make clear
the mechanisms behind this phenomenon. My conclusion is that the Eurozone in-
hibits social pacts by limiting the flexibility of domestic actors to negotiate with the
social partners, and by allowing domestic politicians to redirect blame for austerity
to supranational actors, a valuable blame avoidance strategy.
This work concludes with Chapter 5, which discusses the findings and implica-
tions herein. Additionally, it addresses remaining questions to be answered by future
research on the welfare state.
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Chapter 2
The Two Worlds of Issue Politics: A
Survey Experiment on Welfare State
Retrenchment
For advanced-industrialized countries, the welfare state is the crown jewel of the
post-war consensus. Dramatic government expansions in health, public pensions, and
other social services continuously grew from World War II into the 1970s. Though
expansion was often led by social democratic or Christian democratic parties, other
parties accepted these policies once they became the new status quo. Though the
generosity and structure of the welfare state varied greatly in these countries, once
implemented these policies became foundational aspects of national politics. In the
United States, the public pension system, Social Security, is often called the “third rail
of American politics” because touching it is political suicide. These same dynamics are
present in other advanced industrialized countries. Public support for many welfare
state policies have consistently been high across time (Brooks and Manza, 2007).
This political consensus began to break down in the 1980s. New political leaders,
like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, embraced what later became known
as neoliberalism. This economic ideology rejected the post-war consensus on the
welfare state and their governments took aim at social welfare programs. The electoral
success of these politicians and a nascent economic zeitgeist perhaps motivated social
democratic parties across the globe, who in many cases followed the center-right in
cutting the welfare state. Though the social democrats were often the progenitor
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of welfare state initiatives, they too began engaging in retrenchment in many cases.
This new consensus was apparent in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, where
governments of all varieties enacted austerity programs that cut government services
and spending. The welfare state has reshaped capitalist economies and had dramatic
effects on the public’s well-being. Numerous studies have found that generous welfare
state programs reduce poverty and income inequality (Kenworthy, 1999; Moller et al.,
2003; Bradley et al., 2003) and are essential in supporting a country’s economic model
(Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). The social importance of these social programs makes
understanding the politics of retrenchment critical for the most vulnerable in society.
The traditional view is that welfare state retrenchment is fundamentally unpop-
ular and that politicians seek to hide efforts to cut social programs or seek to divide
the opposition (Pierson, 1996). However, history has shown that politicians have
campaigned on cutting back welfare programs rather than obscuring their intentions.
Even center-left politicians have campaigned on scaling back social programs, in-
cluding Bill Clinton who pledged to “end welfare as we know it”. Instead of blame
avoidance tactics, in many cases, politicians favor persuasion. Though both social
democrats and the center-right have presided over cuts to welfare, it is my contention
that the politics of retrenchment are different for each of these party families. The
political legacies of social democrats and conservatives cast a long shadow and should
continue to influence public perceptions of policy proposals. The driving force behind
this paper is a simple question: How does the messenger affect public perceptions of
welfare cuts?
The issue ownership literature (see Ross (2000b); Green-Pedersen (2002)) argues
that social democrats are politically better able to cut social spending because of
their historical support for the welfare state. These studies aggregate trust in social
democrats with distrust of center-right parties, however, the distinction between trust
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and distrust has important implications for the politics of retrenchment. Conclusions
about the political consequences for social democratic parties that cut the welfare
state would be completely reversed, if the dominant motivator of public perceptions
is instead distrust. Being able to disaggregate the effects of trust and distrust are
both theoretically and practically valuable.
Conceptually, I create a distinction between issue ownership, which is based on
trust, from what I am calling “issue deficits”. An issue deficit is when a party’s
reputation on an issue has been tarnished by their past policy proposals, which would
negatively impact public support for future proposals from that party.
The previously mentioned studies relied upon observational data to measure elec-
toral consequences. However, elections are zero-sum games that are fundamentally
unable to separate the difference between support for one group and opposition for
another. Using this sort of data, it would be impossible to determine voters’ percep-
tions of reforms on a party-by-party basis. These studies leave not only a theoretical
gap but also an empirical gap to be filled.
In order to empirically test the concept of issue deficits, I have conducted a pair
of online vignette experiments to identify what effect policy legacies has on public
perceptions of welfare state retrenchment in Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
presence of a control group allows this study to differentiate between growing support
for one party’s proposal and decreased support for another’s. In these experiments,
I asked participants how much they supported a battery of hypothetical welfare re-
forms, varying the party to which I attributed the proposals.
The major finding of the paper is that the concept of issue deficits is empirically
supported. Rather than viewing Labour’s welfare cuts more favorably because it
developed the modern British welfare state, the public focused on the negative aspects
of Labour’s record. Pension cuts attributed to them, in particular, were significantly
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less supported than the control proposal. The Conservatives had their proposals
punished in multiple policy areas, reflecting their history of retrenching numerous
social programs. Sweden had a separate dynamic, which leads to the second key
finding of this paper.
Contrary to the bulk of the existing literature on welfare state retrenchment, this
paper finds evidence of two distinct dynamics at play across these cases. In the
United Kingdom, issue deficits drive voter perceptions of policy, whereas in Sweden
issue ownership manifests. These opposing dynamics would have been missed if it
were not for the paper’s experimental approach, which allowed me to compare with
a control group. Sweden showed the classic characteristics of the issue ownership
model. Despite having a similar record on retrenchment to the British Labour Party,
the Swedish Social Democratic Worker’s Party had its proposals significantly favored
over the center-right Alliance’s. These results indicate that there are different worlds
of issue politics and no single, totalizing logic that can be applied to all circumstances.
This paper has identified these two different models but the underlying causes of
these political distinctions is left to future research. I suspect that differences in
national party systems is driving the divergent public responses in Sweden and the
United Kingdom. Intra-party factions in two-party systems may lead the public to be
accustomed to being at odds with their party’s line. However, the underlying survey
did not include any means of testing this hypothesis. The existence of both issue
ownership and issue deficits are a novel finding that require further study.
Another important finding of this study is the welfare state is not viewed as a
single political issue by the electorate. The politics of pensions, unemployment, and
health behaved differently, and so future studies of issue ownership should recognize
that the public’s assessment of parties on welfare issues varies from policy to policy.
This paper begins with a discussion of the leading theories related to political par-
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ties and the welfare state and identify the theoretical expectations of the literature.
Next, I present a brief history of the expansion and retrenchment of each policy area
in my cases, in order to set up the theoretical expectations for each case. Then I
move to outline the design of the vignette experiment and detail the methodological
choices I have taken. This is followed by a presentation of the results of the experi-
ments. I proceed with a discussion of the results and their implications for advanced
industrialized countries and conclude with my thoughts for future inquiry.
Partisanship, Issue Ownership, and Retrenchment
The foundational theory of welfare state retrenchment is the New Politics of the
Welfare State (Pierson, 1996). Pierson’s departure from the previous conventional
wisdom is the recognition that the politics of retrenchment is not just expansion done
in reverse. They have different core logics: welfare state expansion is about credit-
claiming and mobilizing support, where retrenchment is about blame-avoidance and
limiting accountability.
The New Politics approach is predicated on the assumption that welfare state
retrenchment is unpopular, which is supported by other studies of public opinion
on welfare state retrenchment. Despite the fact that the public is well aware that
public pay-as-you-go pension funds are strained by demographic shifts, Boeri et al.
(2001) find that the European public still broadly favors maintaining current levels of
welfare. This finding is complicated when you consider the difference in public support
for specific policy changes. In their study, Boeri et al. (2001) find that while the public
opposes retrenchment in general, a majority would opt-out of public pensions in favor
of a mandatory savings program. Boeri et al. (2001) find that ideology explains this
generalized opposition to retrenchment. When offering specific opt-outs to welfare,
people may accept them because of fears relating to the long-term prospects of the
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pension plans, or because they believe they may personally benefit from the change.
Regardless, they accept the cognitive dissonance of reconciling this with their support
for the welfare state by and large. Taylor-Gooby (2001) finds that support for welfare
state programs remains high across advanced industrialized nations, though there is
little support for paying more to sustain programs strained by growing costs.
Despite being unpopular, governments across the political spectrum still engage
in welfare state retrenchment and this raises the question of how the public perceives
welfare cuts depending on the messenger. Political scientists have proposed com-
peting explanations for the relationship between political parties, policy proposals,
and the public opinion. This paper starts with the expectations of three of these
party-centered theories and will test them using an experimental design. The first
body of literature emphasizes partisan loyalty as an explanation. According to this
logic, the public would be more supportive of proposals attributed to their own polit-
ical party and would oppose proposals made by political opponents. This argument
suggests that even normally unpopular reforms are palatable when they come from
co-partisans. The second theory presented is the issue ownership model. Following
a sort of Nixon-Goes-to-China logic, social democratic parties would able to cut wel-
fare because of their strong reputation as staunch supporters of it, but conservatives
would not get the benefit of the doubt and would be forced to rely on blame avoid-
ance tactics. I propose a third model that I call issue deficit theory. I build upon
and depart from issue ownership and argue that instead of parties with a history of
supporting welfare having their retrenchment proposals taken more favorably, parties
that have previously cut welfare would have their future proposals punished.
Partisan Loyalty
A broad body of literature has shown how partisanship influences decision-making and
perceptions. Gerber et al. (2010) conducted an experiment where they encouraged a
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group of independents to register with a party (so that they could vote in a primary)
and found that their views changed to match their party. Partisanship, even among
recent converts, shapes policy preferences. Partisanship has such a strong impact that
they not only influence policy preferences, but also historical facts ((Bullock et al.,
2015; Bartels, 2002). The evidence is quite clear that people’s partisan identity shapes
their perception of political events. Samuels and Zucco (2013) consider the different
permutations of partisan response and look at the effect of partisan cues on policy
perceptions among co-partisans, anti-partisans and non-partisans in Brazil. They find
that by providing a party cue, co-partisans are more likely to support a policy, anti-
partisans will respond more negatively to it, and non-partisans are unaffected. Their
findings indicate that people are move supportive of policies when proposed by their
party than when proposed by a competing party. Non-partisans, people not identified
with a party, do not respond to partisan cues. In-group and out-group effects both
influence policy preferences according to this result. Based on the results of Samuels
and Zucco (2013), there are clear expectations for how the electorate would respond
to welfare state retrenchment proposals. Welfare cuts attributed to one party would
be more supported by people who identify with that party and opposed more by
people belonging to a competing party that is antagonistic to the cued group. Social
democratic voters would like a proposal attributed to the Social Democratic Party
and the Labour Party but would disapprove of proposals from center-right parties.
Issue Ownership
Though social democratic parties traditionally were the primary supporter of welfare
state expansion, since the 1990s they have joined center-right parties in retrenching
the welfare state. The Nixon-Goes-to-China arguments claim that the center-left’s
historical ties to the welfare state has enabled them to make these reforms more
easily than center-right parties could. Ross (2000b) shows how Tony Blair’s Labour
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Party was able to cut a number of social programs without drawing the public’s
ire. He argues that parties have unique liabilities (and also strengths), like how
the Democratic Party in the United States would have never be politically able to
normalize relations with China during the Cold War without suffering accusations
of being soft on communism, but Nixon, an ardent anti-communist, was never going
to be realistically painted that way. Ross (2000b) shows that social democrats are
more successful at retrenchment than the center-right but his method is ultimately
unable to determine if it is driven by trust in social democrats or distrust in the
conservatives.
Kitschelt (2001) argues that party dynamics determine the success or failure of
welfare state retrenchment policies. A weak or discredited opposition leaves the gov-
ernment, left or right, free to make unpopular reforms to the welfare state because
there is no real alternative (Kitschelt, 2001). This also helps to explain Thatcher’s
success in retrenching the U.K.’s welfare state; the Labour Party was stricken with
infighting and division (Pierson, 1996). Social Democrats have benefited in a Down-
sian (see Downs (1957)) sense from a lack of alternatives. The welfare supporting
median-voter won’t switch to support the center-right in response to social democrats
cutting the welfare state because there’s no credible alternative. Punishing a party
for cutting welfare by supporting a party that is even more anti-welfare is a poor
strategy. These voters will come to view the social democrats as the lesser evil to
the aggressively anti- welfare center right (Kitschelt, 2001)). This bipolar center-
left/center-right system has become threatened by the increasing prominence of the
radical-right. More and more voters are considering these parties as reasonable alter-
natives to the “mainstream parties” and this totally changes the political calculus of
parties taking advantage of a There Is No Alternative logic.
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Armingeon et al. (2016) find that the most significant reforms came from broad
center-left coalitions and they attribute this to a Nixon-Goes-to-China logic following
Kitschelt (2001). They argue that center-left parties are more trustworthy on wel-
fare and that their coalitions are politically inoculated from criticism because of this
trust and because of the nature of political competition. Center-right parties cannot
credibly attack social democrats from the left on welfare issues, which eliminates one
of the major political threats to retrenchment. Center-right parties face a different
political landscape, where unions, social democratic parties, and coalitions of people
who would be affected by the cuts can unite in opposition. This opposition could
reasonably coalesce behind social democratic parties and punish the center-right at
the ballot box. These challenges are why some of the most significant welfare cuts
were implemented by center-left coalitions. However, their study doesn’t measure
individual attitudes so there’s no clear causal link shown between public attitudes
and the cuts that get passed by social democratic parties. The theorized mechanism,
public trust of social democrats, goes untested.
A body of literature on issue ownership is closely tied to the Nixon-Goes-to-China
logic. Issue ownership is the notion that a party becomes associated with certain
issues because of their historical commitment to them. Green-Pedersen (2002) finds
that the left’s ownership of welfare issues has enabled social democratic parties to be
trusted when retrenching the welfare state. Since their proposals are viewed as more
necessary, they are able to escape criticisms that they are shredding social protections.
He also identifies party system dynamics play a role in the politics of retrenchment. In
countries with enduring left and right coalitions of parties, consensus on retrenchment
occurs when the center-left holds power. This logic plays out similarly to Kitschelt
(2001) and others that argue that the center-right cannot credibly attack the social
democrats from the left on welfare. On the other hand, countries with pivot systems
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of party competition have Christian Democrats as the leading force. Since Christian
Democrats hold the political balance of power in governments, they take the lead in
welfare retrenchment proposals. A coalition in support of retrenchment occurs when
Christian Democrats push for retrenchment because center-left parties wishing to be
in government will abide this (Green-Pedersen, 2002).
Issue Ownership is often thought of as an enduring characteristic, that remains
stable in the long-term (Seeberg, 2017). The Labour Party in the U.K. struggled
for decades in the wilderness trying to throw off its reputation as a radical party,
controlled by the trade unions (King and Wickham-Jones, 1999). Efforts under several
Labour Party leaders to moderate the party failed to change the public’s mind.1
This durable reputation can withstand injections of cognitive dissonance from parties
acting in conflict with their issue legacy.
Issue Deficits
In contrast to the existing concept of issue ownership, parties may also have an
issue deficit. Not all policies are a winning issue for a political party. Welfare state
retrenchment is notoriously toxic, and it may not behave according to the traditional
issue ownership model. Schumacher et al. (2013) coined the notion of positive and
negative welfare image to describe how parties position themselves on the welfare
state. Generally, social democratic parties take a supportive stance on the welfare
state and center-right parties are more skeptical of the welfare state. They found that
parties with a negative welfare image were not punished if they cut social programs,
whereas parties, such as social democrats, that have a positive welfare image lose
elections after they cut the welfare state. This distinction between positive and
negative welfare images is valuable and demonstrates that the politics of retrenchment
1Though Labour successfully shed it’s radical reputation under Tony Blair’s leadership, the
tremendous effort needed to change a party’s reputation should be considered evidence of the strength
of issue ownership.
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are not so simple as to have a single uniform dynamic. But this study leaves the
question of policy perceptions unanswered.
I instead place focus on public perceptions of the party’s reputation and build
on the existing language of issue ownership. As described above, issue ownership is
the long term benefit a party receives for its commitment to a policy area. But the
existing issue ownership literature only considers party ownership as a single process
that benefits one at the expense of the other party or bloc. However, separating the
benefits to one party and penalties to others, allows for a fine grain assessment of these
policy dynamics. There is ample psychological evidence that indicates that people
are loss averse, and we can expect that the effects of economic loss will be felt more
strongly than gains (see Kahneman et al. (1991)). This is why parties that have both
cut and expanded welfare programs will have their pro-welfare policies discounted
and their welfare cuts remembered. I have coined the term “issue deficit” to capture
the effects of negative perceptions held by the public of a party’s performance. By
splitting issue deficits from issue ownership, I can show the trajectory of public opinion
in a more nuanced way.
An issue deficit acts as the inverse of issue ownership. A party’s legacy can also be
viewed negatively. For example, the electorate may be loath to forget a government
pillaging public pensions. This would not boost the opposition’s reputation on the
issue, but it certainly diminishes the party of government’s reputation on pensions.
If the opposition were to gain power and propose a similar policy, they would have no
protection from the public’s ire. So unlike issue ownership, where a party’s proposal
may be viewed more favorably, an issue deficit makes a party’s proposal exceptionally
unpopular and the other party receives no absolute gain on the issue. This logic should
prevail on an issue like welfare retrenchment that is not politically popular.
The boon to center-left parties presumed by the issue ownership literature may in
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fact be the reflective of the punishment by the electorate of center-right parties for
cutting the welfare state. Public opinion surveys and election results both aggregate
the combination of distrust of one party and trust of another (and in the case of
election results, many other factors as well). This paper enables the quantitative
isolation of both of these phenomena. My theory of issue deficits predicts that center-
right parties will have their proposals viewed less favorably than a neutral policy,
devoid of any partisan association because of the legacy of retrenchment from these
parties. Furthermore, I do not expect any preference for a welfare cut initiated by
the center-left. I expect that past actions in support of the welfare state will not be
much solace to people who are left with a bitter taste in their mouth from proposed
cuts today.
Context and Expectations
This section provides a brief history of each policy area in both countries. This
exercise is necessary in order to clarify the expectations for how each party would
be perceived according to each theory of retrenchment. The discussion will follow
the four major parties and the three policy areas across both countries. The stylized
history will focus on the parties involved in the experiment. In Sweden this means
that the liberal parties are relevant because they are part of the center-right Alliance.
The early contributions from the Liberal Party in the United Kingdom are ignored
here because they are not relevant to the treatment groups in the experiment. This
section starts with a summary of the policies enacted by each of the major parties,
starting in the United Kingdom and then moving onto Sweden. I follow that up with
the theoretical expectations of the tested theories on each case.
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Labour Party
The Labour Party has a mixed record on all three policy areas. Atlee’s Labour
government in the 1940s passed a pair of formative laws, the National Health Service
Act, 1946 and the the National Assistance Act, 1948, which created the foundations
of the modern health, pension, and unemployment systems. After returning to power
after almost two decades in the Wilderness, Labour governments continued to grow
these programs. Tony Blair, in an effort to bolster the National Health Service (NHS),
revised the unpopular Internal Market Reform, created by the Conservatives, and
increased funding for the health service year after year to reduce wait times. A
similar reversal occurred in public pensions, where Blair undid a change enacted by
the Conservatives and returned the earnings-link to pension benefits, increasing the
cost-of-living-adjustment for retirees.
These expansions of social welfare programs are contrasted with several cuts made
by the New Labour governments of Blair and his successor Gordon Brown. Though
Labour had undone the Internal Market Reform, by 2003 Blair had partially privatized
the NHS in England by allowing private providers to compete with NHS hospitals and
physicians. Though these changes significantly decreased waiting periods and were
cost-neutral the public believed that the changes undermined the NHS (Marshall
et al., 2007). Gordon Brown continued this trend and implemented his own set of
privatization reforms for the NHS. Brown’s Any Qualified Provider (AQP) initiative
opened up access for more private providers to receive NHS payments. With regard
to pensions, Blair raised the retirement age for men by two years and brought up the
retirement age for women to match men. These cuts were packaged alongside the
previously mentioned increase to the cost-of-living-adjustment, perhaps to blunt the
shock of these changes. The Jobseeker’s Benefit was turned into a workfare program as
part of Blair’s New Deal. Though spending increased on job training, benefits were
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conditional on participation in one of several work or training schemes, increasing
people’s reliance on the market for their survival. Labour governments have both
expanded and contracted each of these three policy areas.
Conservative Party
The Conservative Party of the U.K. has historically been in favor of scaling back wel-
fare programs and privatization. Conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher,
personified the shift against the welfare state. Her government instituted the Internal
Market Reform, which reorganized the NHS so that payment and provision were sep-
arated. This reform introduced competition into the NHS within the existing publicly
run system. The healthcare reshuffle increased administrative costs because of the
new levels of bureaucracy needed to manage the newly divided roles. This move was
unpopular at the time and the Conservatives have tried to distance themselves from
it. The Conservatives continued to make unpopular changes to the NHS under David
Cameron’s leadership. In the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, Cameron’s coali-
tion government instituted cuts to the NHS as part of a broader austerity package.
Jobs for doctors and nurses were cut, alongside further increases in privatization of
the NHS. In healthcare, none of these cuts were politically offset by countervailing
expansions for the NHS by the party.
Pensions are an area where the conservative party has a mixed record. Under
Thatcher, the Tories indexed the cost-of-living-adjustment to inflation, which grows
more slowly than wages, the original index value. Though it did not impact current
benefits, the reform would decrease payments over the long-run. Labour quickly
reversed these changes when it took Downing Street. When the Tories returned to
power (with the Liberal Democrats as a coalition partner) they took Labour’s reforms
to the cost-of-living-adjustment and expanded them further, in a rebuke of their own
past policies. This center-right coalition created what is known as the “triple-lock”,
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which increases pensions by whichever is highest between earnings, inflation or 2.5
percent. The Conservative Party have distanced themselves from their past pension
reforms and even made expansions to the program’s generosity producing a mixed
record on pensions.
The unemployment system was subject to a series of contentious reforms under
Conservative governments. Echoing the story of public pensions, Thatcher’s govern-
ment adjusted the Jobseeker’s Benefit to grow more slowly over time, by indexing the
benefit to inflation. Additional changes were made in 2011 when the Conservative
Party passed a law to place additional requirements on claimants of the Jobseeker’s
Benefit. The Tories did away with the investments in job training created by Blair
and made work requirements stricter. That law required that some unemployed peo-
ple accept work without pay. After a series of court cases ruling against the law, the
Conservative Party reversed course and repealed the law in 2015. The Conservatives
have a clear record of retrenching unemployment benefits with no contrary actions to
create political ambiguity.
Social Democratic Workers’ Party
The Social Democratic Worker’s Party (SAP) was in government for the vast majority
of the 20th century and played a defining role in the development of the welfare state
in Sweden. The SAP and its allied unions developed the health service, the pension
system, and the unemployment system. These programs continued to be expanded
by the SAP into the 1970s. However, after the financial crises in the 1990s, the SAP
took a more neo-liberal approach to the welfare state. The SAP agreed to a series
of major liberalizing reforms proposed by the bourgeois coalition government and
went even further toward retrenchment when they regained power soon after. In each
policy area, the Social Democrats engaged in retrenchment, either independently or
in cooperation with the center-right Alliance.
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In 1998, the SAP began allowing private bidders to win health service contracts.
This escalation of public dollars going to private companies was a major shift in the
party’s previous position. However, it seems the SAP had not fully embraced private
healthcare because by 2004 the party tried to reverse course and limit the privatization
of the health service. The Social Democrats banned the further privatization of
hospitals and barred private hospitals from taking both public and private patients,
they now had to choose.
The Swedish pension reform was enacted by a cross-partisan deal between the
Social Democrats and the center-right Alliance. This reform changed the health
system from a defined benefit to a defined contribution and required that a portion
of the payroll deductions be invested into the market. This reform now put the
replacement rate of pensions at the mercy of the stock market. Depending on the
vitality of the stock market, replacement rates for a 65 year old Swede could vary
between 54 and 111 percent of their prior salary, which could very well be below the
prior 65 to 75 percent provided by the prior system (Palmer, 2002).
The SAP also was involved in cutting the replacement rate for unemployment
benefits in Sweden. After the krona crisis dragged the center-right Alliance from office,
the SAP took back the reins of power. Though the previous right-wing government
had enacted a number of cuts already, the SAP continued down this path. The Social
Democrats reduced the replacement rate of unemployment benefits from 80 percent
to 75 percent, just after the Alliance lowered it from 90 percent.
In all three policy areas the SAP has been involved in the development and re-
trenchment of the welfare state. This case provides an opportunity to determine how
voters assess social democratic parties’ proposals when they have a mixed record on
whether they grow or shrink social programs.
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The Alliance
The Alliance is a longstanding electoral coalition between the center-right parties of
Sweden. It includes the Moderate Party, The Centre Party, the Christian Democratic
Party and the Liberal Party. Historically, these parties have been kept from govern-
ment because of the overwhelming success of the Social Democratic Party in Sweden,
but since the 1990s they have made their mark on the welfare state of Sweden.
The krona crisis in the 1990s led the Alliance to concerned with market confi-
dence and resulted in them lowing a number of benefits. The pension system was
one of the areas that the government cut to limit government spending. The cost-
of-living-adjustment was reduced and the Alliance created an automatic trigger to
automatically slash the COLA if the country was running a deficit.This pension re-
form was an immediate response, but the Alliance was working on a larger reform to
the pension system, which was the cross-partisan reform described in the section on
the SAP. This unity reform ties these two parties together and splits responsibility
for these cuts between the two groups.
The Alliance responded to the krona crisis with cuts not just to pensions, but
also to unemployment benefits. The replacement rate for unemployment benefits
was among the highest in the world, sitting at 90 percent of one’s previous salary.
This was reduced to 80 percent of prior salary, a sudden and significant 11 percent
reduction in benefit generosity.
Increasing privatization of the health service has long been a policy goal of the
Alliance. The first major shift came in 1993, when the center-right Alliance regained
control of the government. The Alliance began privatizing the health service by
requiring the counties to pay private practice doctors. This marks the first instance
where public dollars were funding private doctors in the current system. In 2010, the
center-right government went even further and required all counties to allow private
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care practices and gave these private companies the right to create healthcare centers
at public expense. The Alliance has a consistent record of privatization with regards
to health.
The Alliance has an unambiguous record on all three policy areas as a supporter
of retrenchment. The differences in perceptions between an Alliance proposal and
a SAP proposal will expose the extent to which developing the welfare state influ-
ences perceptions of retrenchment proposals. This paper moves now to outline the
theoretical expectations for each theory given the past actions taken by each party.
Theoretical Expectations
Table 2.1 summarizes the history of each of the parties under examination in this
paper. Parties that had created or expanded a program and never instituted cuts to
it, were considered to have expanded the policy. Parties that had engaged in both
expansion and contraction of a program were considered to have a mixed record on
the issue. This imperfect summary is unable to show the scope or the relative balance
between expansion and contraction, but the fact remains that for these parties, the
public has two different memories to potentially draw upon. Finally, parties that only
retrenched these programs and made no significant expansions to them were labeled
”cut”.
Table 2.1: Policy Legacies by Policy Area
Health Pensions Unemployment
Labour Party Mixed Mixed Mixed
Conservative Party Cut Mixed Cut
Social Democrats Mixed Mixed Mixed
The Alliance Cut Cut Cut
The issue ownership and issue deficit theories both make clear predictions of how
the public will perceive a policy given the past actions of a party. According to
the issue ownership theory, Social Democratic parties will have their retrenchment
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proposals favored because they previously created or expanded the welfare program.
Conservative parties had not been involved in the development of these programs and
in all cases were involved in scaling them back, although the Conservative Party in the
U.K. did also increase pension generosity. However, though the Conservative Party
had a mixed record, the expansions of pensions followed cuts they had made at an
earlier point in time. This earlier action would lock in their reputation as a welfare
cutter. According to the issue ownership logic, there is a clear center-left/center-
right division. Social Democrats have issue ownership over health, pensions, and
unemployment.
The issue deficit theory suggests that parties who have cut the welfare state will
have their proposals viewed more negatively. In instances where parties have a mixed
record, issue deficits will prevail and their proposals will not be viewed more positively
than the unattributed proposal, despite past efforts to expand welfare policy in that
area. This means that if issue deficit theory holds in both countries, the Labour Party
and the SAP would not have their proposals favored over an unattributed reform.
Research Design
These theories all have expectations for how voters perceive policy proposals from
different political parties. Many of the previous studies conducted on issue ownership
relied on observational designs that looked at national-level responses to retrenchment
initiatives. These approaches cannot distinguish between feelings of acrimony and
the absence of trust on the part of voters. This distinction is not simply nominal,
each of these explanations would have important implications for the politics of the
welfare state. If voters have a long memory and view conservatives’ proposals more
negatively, their experience may serve as a cautionary tale to social democrats that
follow in their steps. On the other hand, if the center-left is benefiting from public
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trust on the issue, their retrenchment may come without cost because the public will
find some way to reconcile it with their prior perceptions of the parties. This study
distinguishes itself from the existing literature because it isolates the effects of these
partisan cues while maximizing internal validity. A further contribution I make is
separating the reward and punishment dynamics of issue ownership.
I conducted a pair of vignette experiments, one in Sweden and one in the United
Kingdom. Participants were recruited by Qualtrics through convenience sampling and
directed to an online survey. The UK experiment was conducted on August 15, 2019
and the Swedish experiment was fielded between October 21 and October 23, 2019.
Both experiments were conducted in between parliamentary elections and at times
when welfare state retrenchment was not particularly salient, minimizing the potential
influence of current events on the findings of the study. As an effort to prevent self-
selection bias, potential respondents were told the study was about public opinion
in their respective countries and not specifically about welfare state retrenchment.
Quotas were in place during sampling for gender and age in order to reflect national
demographics. Participants were offered a choice from a variety of incentives for
completing the survey by Qualtrics. There were 453 and 509 respondents from the
United Kingdom and Sweden, respectively. These respondents were broken up into
four different groups and were asked their background characteristics to use as controls
in the model. Each group received brief descriptions of three policy proposals to
cut specific social welfare programs and were asked how much they supported each
initiative on a five-point scale ranging from “strongly support” to “strongly oppose”.
I asked about cuts to pensions, health, and unemployment insurance. Each of these
policy areas have their own distinct politics and by collecting data on a number of
different programs, I hope to show a broader dynamic and not simply reflect the
politics of, say, unemployment insurance alone.
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The questions in each experiment were adapted for cultural and political relevancy
but remain broadly the same between countries (See Appendix A for the survey
questionnaires in English). For example, each hypothetical cut had to reflect the
unique particularities of each country’s welfare state. Health in Sweden is funded
by localities and unemployment insurance is primarily managed by trade unions,
despite significant public spending for the funds. So the survey necessarily had to
ask about slightly different cuts. In each experiment, the treatment was to whom
the proposal was attributed. In the U.K., the first group was the control and they
had no political party associated with the proposals. The remaining groups had
the hypothetical reforms attributed to either the Labour Party, the Conservative
Party or the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). In Sweden, there was a
control group and groups that had proposals attributed to the Social Democrats, the
center-right Alliance, or to the radical-right Sweden Democrats. Participants were
randomly assigned a treatment group and had the same treatment for all three policy
questions. Asking about three different policy areas helps strengthen the treatment
effect because each proposal is attributed to the same party and also helps to identify
if the results are sensitive to variation in policy. The order of policy questions was
also randomized to prevent the additional treatment to affect policies asked about
further down on the questionnaire.
As mentioned before, I also collected data on various background and demographic
characteristics, which were used as controls in my analysis. Participants reported
their prospective party vote choice from a detailed list of political parties, their party
identification, union membership, gender, income level, age, and religiosity.
Case Selection
The UK and Sweden vary on a number of important socio-economic dimensions.
Most importantly, the countries belong to different welfare state regimes. Liberal
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welfare states like that of the UK tend to focus on using the tax code to incentivize
private provision of welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990). These types of programs hide
social provision and ultimately erode support for the welfare state (Mettler, 2011).
Liberal welfare state regimes use of means-tested programs reduces social support
for welfare more broadly because they’re viewed as handouts and are vulnerable to
rhetoric about deservingness (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The countries differ in terms
of economic growth models (Hall, 2014; Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016), party system,
and Variety of Capitalism. I have selected these two cases precisely because of these
pronounced political-economic differences. Using the logic of a most-different case
study, I aim to show whether or not the findings of these experiments are identical
in very different social settings. This case selection is important because the bulk of
the literature expects a single dynamic even in cases with so much variation.
Results
Figure 2·1 is a graph of the average support for each hypothetical proposal for each
sample. Support was scored on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 corresponding to “strongly
oppose” and 5 corresponding to “strongly support”. In line with the expectations
of the broader welfare state retrenchment body of literature, all three of these pro-
posals were unpopular. The proposed cuts to health were most opposed in both
countries with the average response being between “somewhat oppose” and “strongly
oppose”. Interestingly, health cuts were more unpopular in the United Kingdom than
in Sweden. Though the wording between the U.K. and Sweden surveys were slightly
different (the U.K. survey mentioned that the proposal was to prevent budget short-
falls, whereas the Swedish survey mentioned rising municipal costs as the impetus for
the proposal), the phrasing in the U.K. makes the case for retrenchment seem more
urgent. If anything, the differences in phrasing between the two surveys understates
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British opposition to health cuts.
Figure 2·1: Average Support for Retrenchment Proposals by Country
Figure 2·2 presents the results of the OLS regressions for all three policy areas in
Sweden. Though the proposals attributed to the Social Democratic Party were not
supported significantly more than the control group, respondents did favor a Social
Democratic proposal for cutting pensions to a proposal from the center-right Alliance
(p < 0.05). These results take into account controls for vote intention, meaning that
the findings are not the product of sampling a larger number of social democrats than
other voters.
Figure 2·3 presents the results of the experiment conducted in the United Kingdom
with controls for background characteristics taken into account. The U.K. shows a
different dynamic than in Sweden. The proposals from the Labour Party are rated
worse than the control proposal. Pension cuts stood out and were particularly opposed
when attributed to the Labour Party. This finding was significant at the p < 0.05
level. While the Labour proposals in other policy areas also had negative signs, they
were not significantly different from the control proposals at conventional levels of
33
Figure 2·2: Support for Retrenchment in Sweden by Policy Area
confidence.
I find that attributing a welfare cut to the Conservative party made it significantly
less popular in two different policy areas. Both pensions and health proposals from the
Tories were penalized by the participants. Though less popular than the control, there
was no statistically significant difference in how the respondents perceived proposals
attributed to the Tories and Labour.
I will not spend much time discussing the results of the various control variables
because they mostly conformed to the preexisting expectations of the study (and
the broader literature), however, union membership in the UK is worth a brief aside.
The time-worn finding is that union membership makes people more supportive of the
welfare state. The entire power resources theory (see Korpi (1983); Esping-Andersen
(1985)) is predicated upon organized labor being a force for welfare state expansion. In
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Figure 2·3: Average Approval for Unemployment Proposals
my UK sample, union membership was associated with increased support for welfare
state retrenchment at statistically significant levels. I tested alternative versions of
the model that excluded the participants’ prospective vote choice out of a concern
that this finding is the result of collinearity between voting for Labour and being
in a trade union. However, the result that union members were more supportive
of retrenchment in the United Kingdom remained even without controlling for vote
choice.
I also designed a model measuring the interaction between prospective vote choice
and the treatment groups. This sheds light into how participants responded when
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the proposals were attributed to the party they support (or to a party they oppose).
These results are presented in Table 2.2. These results show no significant evidence for
participants favoring proposals attributed to co-partisans. Partisans who were told
that the cuts came from the party they support did not rate the proposal significantly
higher than their co-partisan peers in the control group. This was the case for all
six parties across both countries. In fact, in the United Kingdom, Labour supporters
were less likely to support health or pension cuts if it came from the Labour Party
(p < 0.10). It is quite clear that the participants did not view welfare cuts from their
co-partisans through rose colored glasses.
Table 2.2: Interaction Effects Models in the UK
Dependent variable:
v pension v health v unemploy
(1) (2) (3)
Cued Left 2.135 1.827 0.532
(1.298) (1.192) (1.473)
Cued Right 1.554 0.848 1.230
(1.248) (1.146) (1.417)
Cued Far-Right 2.092 1.198 0.486
(1.326) (1.218) (1.505)
Age −0.009∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Male 0.180 0.177 0.066
(0.118) (0.108) (0.133)
Income 0.034 −0.045 0.110∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.058)
Union 0.346∗∗ 0.350∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.144) (0.178)
pvBrexit Party −2.273∗ −0.960 0.017
(1.219) (1.119) (1.384)
pvConservative −1.858 −0.800 0.604
(1.210) (1.110) (1.373)
pvGreen Party −2.789∗∗ −1.710 0.448
(1.293) (1.187) (1.467)
pvLabour −2.350∗ −1.235 −0.855
(1.211) (1.111) (1.374)
pvLibDem −1.534 −0.706 −0.015
(1.225) (1.125) (1.390)
pvOther party −2.230∗ −0.668 −0.394
(1.239) (1.137) (1.406)
pvPlaid Cymru −1.766 −1.721 −0.574
(1.367) (1.255) (1.551)
pvSNP −3.214∗∗ −1.795 −0.754
(1.297) (1.191) (1.472)
pvUKIP −3.633∗∗ −1.478 −0.533
(1.678) (1.540) (1.904)
Cued Left:pvBrexit Party −2.056 −1.277 −0.628
(1.424) (1.307) (1.616)
Cued Right:pvBrexit Party −1.718 −1.159 −1.406
(1.315) (1.207) (1.492)
Cued Far-Right:pvBrexit Party −1.827 −0.909 0.041
(1.381) (1.268) (1.567)
Cued Left:pvConservative −2.767∗∗ −2.087∗ −0.630
(1.332) (1.223) (1.512)
Cued Right:pvConservative −1.888 −1.033 −0.976
(1.286) (1.180) (1.459)
Cued Far-Right:pvConservative −2.587∗ −1.563 −0.620
(1.365) (1.253) (1.549)
Cued Left:pvGreen Party −2.139 −1.667 −1.829
(1.457) (1.338) (1.653)
Cued Right:pvGreen Party −1.334 −0.545 −1.932
(1.400) (1.285) (1.589)
Cued Far-Right:pvGreen Party −2.088 −1.576 −2.246
(1.492) (1.370) (1.694)
Cued Left:pvLabour −2.317∗ −2.039∗ −0.253
(1.331) (1.222) (1.510)
Cued Right:pvLabour −1.810 −1.211 −1.019
(1.279) (1.174) (1.451)
Cued Far-Right:pvLabour −2.235 −1.297 −0.505
(1.356) (1.245) (1.539)
Cued Left:pvLibDem −3.064∗∗ −2.447∗ −1.122
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(1.363) (1.252) (1.547)
Cued Right:pvLibDem −2.878∗∗ −1.850 −1.917
(1.318) (1.210) (1.495)
Cued Far-Right:pvLibDem −3.241∗∗ −2.159∗ −1.603
(1.392) (1.278) (1.580)
Cued Left:pvOther party −3.206∗∗ −2.766∗∗ −0.341
(1.419) (1.303) (1.610)
Cued Right:pvOther party −1.300 −1.862 −1.243
(1.402) (1.287) (1.591)
Cued Far-Right:pvOther party −1.930 −1.377 0.461
(1.461) (1.341) (1.658)
Cued Left:pvPlaid Cymru
Cued Right:pvPlaid Cymru −3.647∗∗ 0.215 −0.401
(1.653) (1.518) (1.876)
Cued Far-Right:pvPlaid Cymru −3.701∗ −1.861 −1.421
(1.904) (1.748) (2.161)
Cued Left:pvSNP
Cued Right:pvSNP −1.348 −0.708 −2.125
(1.439) (1.321) (1.633)





Constant 5.073∗∗∗ 3.860∗∗∗ 3.134∗∗
(1.212) (1.113) (1.376)
Observations 453 453 453
R2 0.130 0.213 0.223
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.141 0.151
Residual Std. Error (df = 414) 1.180 1.083 1.339
F Statistic (df = 38; 414) 1.632∗∗ 2.956∗∗∗ 3.123∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Rather than finding any evidence of co-partisan favoritism, I find that partisans
did respond more negatively to proposals attributed to ideological opponents. The
Lib Dems supporters were more opposed to proposals in all three treatment groups
compared to the control group. Conservatives balked at a proposal from Labour
to cut the NHS. Prospective voters for Plaid Cymru showed less support for welfare
cuts when attributed to the Tories. Each of these instances show that at conventional
levels of confidence that antagonistic partisanship is playing a role here.
Taken together, these results show mixed support for the theories presented. The
Swedish experiment aligns primarily with the issue ownership model. Social demo-
cratic proposals were favored over center-right and radical-right proposals. A separate
dynamic entirely was present in the United Kingdom. Instead of rewarding parties
that played a role in the creation of the welfare state, respondents punished parties
that engaged in cuts to the welfare state, aligning with the issue deficit model of
retrenchment politics.
I found no evidence in support of the primary expectation of the partisanship
theory. Though the literature has emphasized how much the public will morph their
beliefs to conform with partisan identities, on this issue, I find no evidence of this
dynamic. I attributed proposals to three different political parties in each country
and the respondents who had co-partisanship with their treated party were not more
supportive of the cuts.
In both cases, a different partisan dynamic manifested. Rather than providing
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a boon to proposals from a co-partisan, partisanship seemed to sink proposals from
opposing political parties. This type of antagonistic partisanship was expected in
addition to co-partisan favoritism, yet antagonism manifested independently of it in
the experiments.
Discussion
First, I uncovered empirical evidence in support of my issue deficit hypothesis. The
experiment in the UK shows clear evidence of a major political party being punished
without any other party being a clear beneficiary on the issue. Instead of retrenchment
being more popular when it comes from social democrats, there’s clear evidence that
some proposals are viewed more negatively when they come from parties with a history
of retrenchment. Both Labour and the Conservatives had their proposals viewed more
negatively than the neutral proposal in areas where they engaged in retrenchment in
the past. People tend to be loss-averse, and cuts will be more memorable than gains
(especially gains from long ago). This fundamental logic was supported in the UK.
Though I hypothesized that this dynamic would dictate politics in both cases, it only
played out that way in the United Kingdom. This partial vindication of my original
hypothesis leads to the second major finding of this study.
Second, this paper finds that the politics of retrenchment vary across nations. This
cannot be understated enough because of how ubiquitous theories are that claim to
apply across all advanced-industrialized economies. These universal theories explain
variation across countries with one single unifying logic. However, my results show
that the core logics differs across countries and the rules are not the same everywhere.
The expectations of the issue ownership model are validated in Sweden because wel-
fare cuts actually gain support when you attribute them to the Social Democrats.
Yet in the United Kingdom, the Labour Party is not recognized for its role in de-
veloping the NHS and it is most certainly not rewarded for the implementation of
universal public pensions in 1948. Revisions to the pension system that I attributed
to Labour were more unpopular (p < 0.05) than neutral proposals when controlling
for prospective vote intention. This behavior reflects an issue deficit, rather than
issue ownership. Both parties are actively distrusted to reform pensions in the UK
and the unattributed proposal is most popular. Instead of a single monolithic logic,
there are distinct worlds of welfare state retrenchment, each with their own unique
politics. Issue ownership would expect that in the UK the Labour Party would have
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lasting goodwill on welfare issues and this was not the case in my experiment.
The Swedish Social Democratic Party’s ownership of pension reform indicates
public trust in the ability of the party to manage major reforms to the social safety
net. This is evidence that political parties can help sell fundamentally unpopular
reforms to the public. However, this systemic trust does not carry over to all social
democratic parties. The Labour Party in the UK did not receive any added public
trust. The logic of the issue ownership theory would suggest that this distinction
may be the result of New Labour shedding its social democratic/pro-welfare identity.
Yet, this gulf between the two social democratic parties is not simply a result of
different policy legacies. Though the Labour Party under Tony Blair implemented
welfare cuts in areas like education, the Social Democratic Party in Sweden was
also part of major reforms as well. In fact, in Sweden the Social Democrats worked
with the center-right Alliance to reform pensions. The differences between the two
parties cannot be explained by the Labour Party’s neoliberal shift under Blair alone
because a similar shift occurred in Sweden following their return to government in
the 1990s. There must be another factor that explains why these two parties are
perceived differently when they both have been agents of retrenchment.
This finding opens up a new avenue for research on the welfare state. The origins
and causes for this variation remain to be uncovered by future studies. In my view,
party systems would be a fruitful first place to look for these origins. The varia-
tion between the cases may be the result of differences in political parties and party
systems.
The logic of party systems mediates how voters respond to political information.
Single-Member District systems with plurality rules produce two party systems and
catch-all parties. These catch-all parties are prone to factionalism and this has dra-
matic consequences on how voters respond to partisan cues. The Labour Party has
two distinct wings, a moderate New Labour wing, and a left wing. The party had
struggled with internal division in the 1970s and 1980s, but the overwhelming victory
of the party in 1997 gave Labour a large enough margin in Parliament that these
intra-party struggles did not come to a head. The New Labour wing was dominant
and implemented a series of cuts to social programs including the implementation of
tuition fees at colleges and taxing pension dividends. Labour members from the left
wing opposed these policies and went against the party whip on votes. The intra-
party division is recognized by voters and they will not treat the initiative as the
proposal of the whole party. Since it is ostensibly a different faction of the party
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making the cuts, they may not receive the benefits of issue ownership in the minds of
the electorate. Whenever partisans hear a proposal they disapprove of from their own
party, they are ready to understand this development through the lens of intra-party
conflict: “It must be the damn Blairites.” These voters already have a prepared frame
to reconcile the cognitive dissonance of their party doing something of which they
disapprove, and the experiment did show that the participants disliked these reforms.
These political conditions come from the UK’s two-party system, which decreases
partisanship and increases factionalism. These factors may work together to reduce
the chance that parties can influence their voters to swallow a tough pill. The results
of this study hint at this dynamic. When prospective Labour voters were told that
the proposal was coming from the Labour party, they became less supportive of the
reform than the control group of Labour voters (see Table 2.2).
Future research should attempt to isolate the effects of party systems on the poli-
tics of retrenchment. This poses a challenge because welfare state regimes and party
systems often coincide. Differences between Conservative (or Christian Democratic)
welfare state regimes and Social Democratic welfare state regimes could be tested
holding party systems constant, potentially ruling out welfare regimes as a factor in
people’s preference development. France has majoritarian elements in its electoral
system and does not have a liberal welfare state regime, but the frequent emergence
and dissipation of political parties in France makes longstanding party legacies diffi-
cult to trace.
This paper’s finding that issue ownership and deficit on welfare varies on a pol-
icy by policy basis raises new questions about whether a right-wing party can have
issue-ownership of a welfare issue if they originally created the program. Free public
university education in the United Kingdom is one such area, where the center-right
created the system and the center-left retrenched it. Does this situation behave ac-
cording to the issue ownership/deficit model or are there spillover effects from other
policy areas that prevent the Tories from having a good reputation here? Does the
public even recognize the Tories as the creator of the free public university system?
This is unexplored territory and the answers to these questions would shed light onto
how voters retain issue-specific memory.
This paper also serves as a cautionary tale for politicians who may seek to cut the
welfare state. The political risks of retrenchment go beyond short-term public opinion
and can create a lasting issue deficit depending on the political circumstances of that
country. In certain cases, it appears that the public is loath to forget a party’s legacy
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in cutting the welfare state. Past policies are sticky and become lasting impressions
in the minds of voters.
In summary, the age of the grand unified theory of welfare state retrenchment is
behind us. This study has opened a door to reveal two different worlds of welfare
state retrenchment, each with their own unique politics. In one world, parties have
the political cachet to actually convince the public to support an utterly unpopular
reform. In another, the electorate holds parties accountable for their failures (while
discounting their accomplishments). Since both the Labour Party and the Social
Democratic Party have engaged in retrenchment initiatives (and recent expansions of
some welfare policies), the policy legacies of each party do not provide a satisfying
explanation for the variation found in this study. Instead, differences in how voters
perceive and respond to parties are at the core of the question. Whether this is
affected by differing values, institutional incentives, or some combination of causes
remains to be seen. What can be said for certain is that a lot more matters than
what the parties are actually proposing to cut.
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Chapter 3
Rethinking the Radical Right:
Euroskepticism and Economic Populism
The European Radical Right
No longer marginal parties, the radical right is now a legitimate contender for the reins
of political power. A crucial component of their meteoric rise has been their opposition
to immigration. Many have defined these parties on that characteristic alone (see
Husbands (1992); Fennema (1997); Ivarsflaten (2005)). This paper takes a different
stance. Yes, absolutely, anti-immigrant attitudes have been a core component of the
radical right’s agenda and political growth. Yet, this paper argues that euroskepticism
and economic anxiety are also prime motivators for radical right voters. However, I
do not mean to take these issues and present them as completely independent of one
another; to do so would miss the forest for the trees. The Xenophobia, euroskepticism,
and economic populism of radical right voters all reflect a deep insecurity about their
place in an ever-changing world. Furthermore, economic anxiety may manifest as
xenophobia and xenophobia may manifest as euroskepticism. Yet, despite the deep
connections and overlap among these phenomena, these beliefs can be disentangled.
This paper argues that euroskepticism and economic anxiety are key independent
motivators of radical right voters and shows how radical right parties have used these
political issues to draw in voters. I advance this argument this using a mixed methods
approach. My quantitative analysis uses data from the 2008 European Values Survey
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to identify the characteristics and beliefs of radical right voters. Conducted in the
midst of the global recession, this survey provides a snapshot into the beliefs of voters
in a time when economic issues are of vital importance and where the radical right
had grown in vote share (see Figure 3·1 for the vote share of radical right parties
in the two elections that precede and follow the crisis). The radical right gained
an additional 2.5 percent of the parliamentary vote share from the previous election
result.1 I move on to show in the qualitative analysis how these themes are used by
radical right parties in practice. The case studies illustrate that anti-EU appeals are
often divorced from immigration and that welfare chauvinism is a key part of their
approach.
Figure 3·1: Vote Share of Selected Radical Right Parties Before and
After the Crisis
There are two main contributions made by this paper. First, I improve upon
the methodology used by other similar studies. Other papers compare radical-right
voters to other voters, overall. My paper is able to compare radical-right voters to
center-right and center-left voters separately. This reveals that radical-right voters
have different economic views than center-right and center-left voters, falling in the
1Calculations are the author’s own based on data from Adam Carr’s Psephos election archive
(Carr, 2014), with the data originally sourced from official government reported results.
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middle between them. If I had instead compared to just “other voters”, the result
would have been masked because the average of center-left and center-right voters
would have looked identical to the radical-right, which is actually distinct from both
of those parties. My second primary contribution is showing that euroskepticism is
not simply a manifestation of xenophobia.2 Controlling for anti-immigrant values in
my models, euroskepticism has an independent effect on voting for the radical right.
My model reveals that being euroskeptic makes someone much more likely to support
the radical right. Comparing two people with strong anti-immigrant views, one of
whom is strongly euroskeptic while the other is strongly supportive of the EU, the
euroskeptic person is more than four times more likely to vote for the radical right.
The current literature has emphasized the role of anti-immigration sentiments in
the expansion of the radical right at the expense of the important role that eco-
nomic issues play for their voters. Just as the social democrats have a vision for
the welfare state, so too does the radical right. While social democratic parties his-
torically emphasized universalism, the radical right offers welfare chauvinism to the
electorate. Welfare chauvinism combines support for generous social programs with
an exclusionary implementation. Benefits are to be provided for worthy in-group
members, particularly the elderly, while outsiders like immigrants are left out of the
social safety net. This alternative vision for the welfare state has contributed to the
newfound success of the radical right.
Traditionally, working class voters have supported the social democratic vision for
social programs and trusted these parties to be fair-minded stewards of the welfare
state because of their long-term ideological commitment to it. However around the
same time that the radical right has emerged, the center-left in Europe has embraced
2See Stockemer et al. (2018) for a meta-analysis of studies relating anti-immigrant attitudes to
euroskepticism. Stockemer et al. (2018) concludes that anti-immigrant attitudes trigger euroskepti-
cism.
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neoliberalism, culminating in the center-left parties’ support of austerity programs
in the face of the Eurozone crisis. This has created an opportunity for radical right
parties to fill the vacuum created by the center-left’s embrace of austerity. Recognizing
that economic populism is undersupplied by the mainstream parties, the radical right
has increasingly utilized rhetoric calling for the expansion or protection of the social
spending.
The radical right has also led the charge against the European Union. Its critique
of the EU is threefold. First, the free movement of people within the Schengen Area
has enabled increased immigration between European countries. In 2018, 3.9 percent
of Europeans were living in a EU country besides their home-country. These numbers
are dramatically higher for some countries like Romania, where 21.3 percent of its
citizens were living elsewhere in the EU (Eurostat, 2019). Immigration from poorer
parts of Europe has been of particular concern for the radical right. They also have a
concern about national sovereignty more generally. Second, the EU has taken powers
traditionally reserved for the nation-state and weakened national sovereignty. Though
being able to enact new harsher immigration laws is certainly part of their appeal for
more national sovereignty, their rejection of supranational government goes deeper
than just immigration laws. Third, the economic integration of European countries
has created the possibility of redistribution across the EU. After the Eurozone crisis
concerns about bailing out governments struggling with debt have come to a head and
become part of the radical right critique of the EU. The radical right has questioned
why should their population provide emergency loans to Greece and other debtor
countries.
This paper utilizes a pair of multinomial logistic regression models to analyze
recent European Values Survey data from ten western European countries. My mod-
els improve upon existing studies by comparing radical right supporters to the the
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supporters of the center-right and social democrats separately, rather than to the pop-
ulation at large. This approach allows for more fine-grained distinctions among the
electorate by disaggregating the alternatives to the radical right. Such a design allows
us to glean increased information on economic preferences that otherwise would be
lost by combining social democrats and the the center-right into one category.
Immigration-focused theories fail to explain how radical right parties maintain
(and in many cases expand) their support in periods of recession. The logic of
these theories suggests that when the electorate prioritizes economic management,
the immigration-focused radical right will founder. The economic populism model
better explains support for the radical right and helps to explain their continued
support in the aftermath of the 2008 European economic crisis.
The paper begins with an examination of the existing literature that explains why
people support the radical right and present the leading theories that try to provide
an answer to the question. I go on to outline my research design to test the theories
developed in the first section. After I present the results of my multinominal logistic
models, I turn to a series of case studies of radical right parties in Denmark, Swe-
den, and Austria. In each of these countries, I analyze the campaign advertisements
and political rhetoric of the radical right to demonstrate just how they use euroskep-
ticism and welfare chauvinism to appeal to working-class voters independently of
anti-immigrant messages.
Why Support the Radical Right?
Anti-Immigration
Even a cursory glance at the radical right is enough to see that immigration is a
crucial part of their agenda. Husbands (1992) calls it their “raison d’être”. The
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meteoric rise of the radical right has often been explained using the concept of issue
ownership. The radical right has such a command of the immigration issue that some
have taken to even calling them single-issue parties or have defined them in terms of
their immigration stance (Husbands, 1992; Fennema, 1997). Ivarsflaten (2005) has
argued that having been centered around the immigration issue, the success of the
radical right lives and dies by the salience of the issue. She argues that the high level
of support they currently enjoy does not indicate any sort of permanent realignment,
but instead just the transient concern of Europeans about immigration. Accordingly,
as traditional economic cleavages become more salient, the radical right parties will
fade away (Ivarsflaten, 2005).
The complete dominance of the radical right on the immigration issue in so many
countries is a result of policy convergence according to some. Looking at Sweden,
Loxbo (2014) finds that support for the radical right is a consequence of the elec-
torate’s views on immigration and not the result of protest votes. He goes on to
argue that because the mainstream parties have converged on a single position on
immigration, there is no contestation of the issue among them and this builds addi-
tional support for the radical right in the short-term (Loxbo, 2014). Protest voting
was a potential explanation for why the radical right succeeds even when the economy
is more salient than immigration; however, the data do not support this theory and
we must continue to search for an explanation.
Euroskepticism
Another body of literature has emphasized the importance of the radical right’s eu-
roskeptic agenda. The European Union has been perceived as a threat to national
sovereignty by radical right parties and their supporters. Nationalism and ethnocen-
trism have motivated the radical right to oppose deepening Europeanization. This
47
ideological predisposition is compounded with a general distrust in politicians at all
levels. Efforts to disentangle these factors have identified independent effects for eu-
roskepticism. Werts et al. (2013) found that between 2002 and 2008 euroskepticism
was a significant predictor of whether or not someone would vote for the radical right
in Europe after controlling for political trust. The underlying data used by Werts
measured support for the radical right using retrospective votes. However, it would be
ideal to know how the population would vote today based on their current attitudes
rather than how they voted years ago. This design weakness has beset many studies
on the subject as a result of limited availability of better data.
Mudde (2007) finds that the radical right parties ostensibly support EU mem-
bership but have invested a great deal of energy into criticizing its performance and
standing against an ever closer union. While they voice nominal support for Europe,
they are quick to criticize nameless European bureaucrats (Mudde, 2007, pp.165). In
effect, they criticize every decision made by the EU and have stood in the way of
increasing Europeanization. Although since the Eurozone crisis, even this feeble lip-
service to the EU has faded as more of the parties are calling for outright withdrawal
from the EU as seen in the Brexit campaign.
Economic Vulnerability
The campaign for Brexit demonstrated the way that anti-immigrant and economic
appeals have been incorporated by the radical right. The economic component has
been important for gaining the support of blue-collar workers that traditionally had
supported social democratic parties. The role of economic appeals in the success of
the radical right has been understudied. Those who do consider economics tend to
emphasize the role of economic vulnerability, which manifests itself as anti-immigrant
sentiments due to perceived competition for employment. Rydgren and Ruth (2011)
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tested the economic vulnerability thesis and found that in Sweden support for the
radical right was concentrated in municipalities with lower Gross Regional Product
per capita and education. Furthermore, the Sweden Democrats received higher vote
shares in municipalities with higher levels of unemployment (Rydgren and Ruth,
2011, p. 217 ). Swank and Betz (2003) argue that radical right voters are the losers
of deindustrialization and that countries with more universalistic welfare states are
able to reduce support for the radical right by addressing the dislocations of evolving
capitalism. In 2003, it certainly had appeared that countries with social democratic
welfare states had inoculated themselves against the radical right, however, the recent
success of radical right parties in each of the Scandinavian countries casts doubt on
this hypothesis. In each of these countries, the radical right has become a major
player and oftentimes is the third largest party.
Redistribution and Welfare Chauvinism
The radical right has made new overtures to working class voters since their early
days. These parties have trended left on economic issues as shown in Figure 3·2. This
figure plots major radical right parties across time using Chapel Hill Expert Survey
(CHES) data. According to the CHES, the radical right has moved significantly left
on economic issues since 1999. On a ten-point scale, the average score for radical
right parties has moved 1.99 points left. Every radical right party represented (with
the exception of the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)) has shifted leftward
on economic policy since the beginning of this period. The trajectory of the Danish
People’s Party (DF) is particularly stark. What was originally founded as a tax revolt
party has now moved dramatically toward favoring government intervention into the
economy. The consistency of this shift from right to left on economic issues may
suggest that this new position is essential to the character of the radical right party
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Figure 3·2: Expert Placement of Radical Right Parties, 1999-2014
family. Considering the platforms of radical right parties tells a similar story.
A political party’s platform is a microcosm for their rhetoric more generally. Fig-
ure 3·3 has been included in order to show how the radical right has evolved over time
on the welfare state. The FPÖ, the DF, and the FN are three of the most successful
and oldest radical right parties in Europe. These parties had the most platforms
included in the Comparative Manifesto Project, which allowed me to trace rhetorical
shifts over time. As you can see in Figure 3·3, the trend is toward a greater percent
of these parties’ manifestos being devoted to the welfare state since their origins.3
While the DF has shown less attention since 2005, it still commits about 6 percent
of its platform to expanding the welfare state. Also, it is worth mentioning that the
Comparative Manifesto Project did not score the manifestos of the DF in its early
days as an anti-tax party. If the data were extended further back, we would see a
3In 2001, there is a sharp and sudden drop in mentions of welfare expansionist rhetoric in the
Danish People’s Party’s manifesto. That year the platform of the DPP was brief and lacked policy
detail and specificity. The decline does not really reflect a sudden drop in support for the welfare
state, but rather a sudden drop in specificity.
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Figure 3·3: Welfare State Expansion in Party Manifestos
spike in support for the welfare state from the DF like for the other major radical
right parties.
Perhaps, this change could be attributed to the professionalization of the radical
right instead of any type of ideological change. As the radical right has tried to
become a significant electoral force, they may have taken more stances on a wider
range of issues. They are expected to put forward a more complete, realistic platform.
I contend that this alone cannot explain the rhetorical change.
Figure 3·4 shows how much attention the radical right has devoted to welfare
state retrenchment over time. It is clear that these parties staked out a position on
welfare state retrenchment quite early. The DF included welfare state retrenchment
in its manifesto before any of the parties of the center-right in Denmark (Volkens
et al., 2016). These stances on retrenchment preceded the radical right’s increased
rhetorical commitment to expanding the welfare state. The argument that it took
electoral success to pressure the radical right to branch out and take a stance on the
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Figure 3·4: Welfare State Retrenchment in Party Manifestos
welfare state does not hold up to scrutiny. As you would expect, Figure 4 shows
that the increase in expansionary welfare state rhetoric coincided with a decrease in
attention for welfare state retrenchment.
At the intersection of economic concerns and xenophobia lies welfare chauvinism.
The commonly accepted definition was coined by Andersen and Bjørklund (1990),
who identified it as the idea that “welfare services should be restricted to ‘our own’”.
The exclusion of outsiders has been a prominent part of the rhetoric of radical right
parties, which has led researchers such as Van der Waal et al. (2013) to examine the
determinants of welfare chauvinism. Van der Waal et al. (2013) hypothesized that
there would be effects from welfare regimes upon public sentiments toward immigrants
receiving benefits. They found however that higher levels of income inequality caused
higher levels of welfare chauvinism regardless of a country’s welfare state regime. Im-
portantly, differences in unemployment or labor market regulation had no significant
effect on welfare chauvinism.
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De Koster et al. (2012) have tested this hypothesis in the Netherlands using a
survey measuring different dimensions of welfare chauvinism. For De Koster et al.
(2012), welfare chauvinism is the combination of exclusionary views mixed with a fa-
vorable opinion of redistribution. In that study, they found that there is no difference
in the electorate of the radical right and the old-left (social democrats) on welfare
state issues (De Koster et al., 2012, pp. 16). They interpret this result to mean that
welfare chauvinist voters are as likely to vote for the radical right and the old-left
when the issue is salient.
Research Design and Data
Political science has identified anti-immigrant attitudes, euroskepticism, economic
vulnerability and support for welfare chauvinism as motivations for radical right
voters. I have constructed a multinomial logit model to test these various theo-
ries predicting support for radical right parties in ten European countries. My data
is derived from the European Values Survey conducted in 2008. This wave of the sur-
vey included specific questions with regard to immigration that aided this study. My
cases (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and Sweden) were selected on the basis of their inclusion in the Euro-
pean Values Survey and their having a radical right party contesting the upcoming
election.
As discussed in the previous section, many existing studies are undercut by the
available data and scholars have resorted to less than ideal metrics for voter prefer-
ences. The commonly used Eurobarometer survey only asks how respondents voted
in the previous election, ignoring their current party preferences entirely. Because of
this I have opted instead to employ the European Values Survey. This survey instead
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asks participants how they would vote if the parliamentary elections were today. By
asking the public who they would vote for, this study can make a stronger claim about
the connection between an individual’s policy preferences and their vote preference
than if it asked about how they voted at the last election (which could be years ago).
Similar studies that instead use Eurobarometer’s question about how they voted in
the last election (Lubbers et al., 2002, c.f.) are trying to prove that how people voted
years ago is influenced by their preferences today, which is clearly causally tenuous.
My design makes the cause and effect much more proximal and can better elucidate
the relationship between public opinion and vote choice.
Because of the EVS questions, my dependent variable is which party the respon-
dent would vote for if the election were held tomorrow. I have recoded these responses
as “center-right”, “center-left”, and “radical right”. Each political party was given
an individual identification number by the survey, which I recoded into party families
using the classification used by David Art (Art, 2011, p. 6) and the Comparative Man-
ifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2016). I have labeled parties as radical right following
Art and the remaining parties were mapped using the CMP. This aggregated the par-
ties into 10 different groups (Greens, Socialist, Social Democrat, Liberal, Christian
Democrat, Conservative, Radical Right, Agrarian, Regionalist, and Special-Issue).
Which parties constitute the radical right is somewhat contested. This paper follows
David Art and considers Vlaams Blok, Lega Nord, and the Swiss People’s Party rad-
ical right despite some other typologies, notably the Comparative Manifesto Project,
labeling them regionalist or agrarian. I’ve opted for their inclusion because of their
strong anti-immigrant rhetoric and out of an abundance of caution.
I have condensed these party families further into a “center-left”, “right”, “radical
right” trichotomy, with parties not easily falling into one category excluded. The final
dependent variable has social democratic parties labeled as center-left, radical right
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parties as radical right, and liberal, christian democratic, and conservative parties
labeled as right. This primarily excludes far-left , green and agrarian parties from my
analysis. Agrarian parties do not have a consistent left-right position across countries
making their placement impossible to generalize. Increasingly green parties have a
similarly varied economic ideology. Rather than have to make determinations for each
party based on their positions, these parties were excluded. One of this paper’s goals
is to improve upon previous efforts to compare the radical right to mainstream parties.
On this basis, I have excluded far-left parties that because they are immaterial to this
empirical question (see Appendix A for a full listing of each party’s classification).
Other studies have instead used a binary dependent variable (Rydgren and Ruth,
2011, c.f.), however my categorical dependent variable more accurately mirrors the
choice before the electorate and captures information that would be lost by simplifying
to a binary outcome. Rather than comparing the radical right voters to the electorate
at large, my model is able to compare them to the voters of the center-left and center-
right separately.
The process for deriving the independent variables was simple. Inequality Toler-
ance is a proxy intended to capture an element of welfare chauvinism, without having
problematic levels of covariance with anti-immigrant variables. Survey participants
were asked if income should be more equal or if larger differences in income are needed
as incentives. Lower scores indicate more support for income equality and larger
scores indicate more support for inequality as an incentive. Attitudes toward immi-
grants are measured by the question “Do immigrants undermine the culture of their
home-country?” Lower values on this scale indicate higher levels of anti-immigrant
sentiments. This is measured by the variable Pro-Immigrant. The Income variable
is a continuous variable showing self-reported monthly income, presented in euros at
purchasing power parity.
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Distrust in the EU and the national parliament are measured similarly. Survey
participants were asked how much confidence they have in these institutions with high
values approaching no confidence at all. Confidence in the national parliament is an
important control variable to test euroskepticism as it helps isolate people specifically
opposed to the EU. Supporters of the radical right are expected to be less trust-
ing of government in general and so distinguishing between opposition to national
parliaments and the EU was critical to testing this hypothesis.
I was confronted with numerous choices in selecting a model. The multinomial
logit, while easier to interpret than the alternatives relies on a key assumption of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). To test this assumption I performed a
Hausman-McFadden Test on the finished models and arrived at a negative χ2 value.
Hausman and McFadden (1984) argue that negative values indicate that the IIA
assumption holds, suggesting that the multinomial logit is the appropriate model for
the question at hand.
Table 3.1 shows the results of my two models. The coefficients in the model are
given with reference to the radical right. The results should be interpreted as the
independent variables’ effects on the likelihood of voting for a given party, relative to
the radical right. In Model 1 income, gender, and age are all statistically significant at
the 0.01 level. Having a lower income makes one less likely to support the center-right
and more likely to vote for radical right or social democratic parties.This finding lends
credence to the theory that the radical right’s supporters are disaffected low-income
voters. There is notably no significant difference between voters of the radical right
and the center-left on income.
Men are also significantly more likely to support the radical right than women
and there is no gender gap between the center-left and the center-right. Tolerance for
inequality is significant at the 0.1 level as shown by Table 3.1. While it fails to reach
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Table 3.1: MNL Models of Support for the Radical Right
Model 1 Model 2
Center-Left Center-Right Center-Left Center-Right
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male −0.378∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗ −0.406∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.111) (0.121) (0.118)
Age 0.008∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Income −0.074 0.148∗∗∗ −0.074 0.137∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.047) (0.052) (0.049)
Pro-Immigrant 0.405∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
Inequality Tolerance −0.145∗∗∗ 0.039∗ −0.172∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023)
Euroskepticism −0.569∗∗∗ −0.645∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.082)
Distrust of Parliament −0.379∗∗∗ −0.634∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.087)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 8,778.613 8,778.613 8,200.567 8,200.567
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Multinomial logistic estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
Country fixed-effects calculated but not shown. Table generated us-
ing stargazer.
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conventional levels of significance, inequality’s effect is underestimated by the model
by the inclusion of regionally-based radical right parties and controlling for income.
Adjusting the reference group to compare social democrats and center-right parties
shows that the Pro-Immigration variable has a clear hierarchy among the three types
of parties, with the radical right being the most anti-immigrant, followed by the
right, with the center-left being the most in favor. This confirms the basic premise
of immigration-centered theories; this is not a surprising finding, for sure, but it is
important to note that the other variables maintained significance despite controlling
for the effects of anti-immigrant sentiments.
Table 3.1 also shows the results of the second model that tests the effects of
euroskepticism. As expected by the existing literature, a lack of trust in government
is a significant predictor (at the .01 level) of support for the radical right. Holding
trust in government constant, euroskepticism separates the radical right from both the
center-left and the center-right. This finding is significant at the 0.01 level and shows
with a high degree of certainty that there is an effect of euroskepticism independent
of anti-immigrant or anti-government sentiments. In the presence of euroskepticism,
inequality tolerance is no longer significant predictor of voting for the radical right.
Figure 3·5 shows the effect of euroskepticism on the probability of voting for
the radical right at otherwise ideal conditions. In generating Figure 3·5, I set the
background characteristics to be highly favorable to the radical right, which means
that the figure displays the effect of euroskepticism on a highly anti-immigrant male,
youth. Even at these extreme conditions the probability of this person voting for the
radical right is very small if they strongly support the EU. Going from the highest
level of confidence in the EU to the least amount makes someone more than four
times as likely to vote for the radical right.
This quantitative analysis highlights the importance of euroskepticism. The re-
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Figure 3·5: Predicted Probability of Voting for Radical Right
sults are more mixed with regards to income inequality. I find that pro-welfare state
rhetoric has increasingly been used by the radical right and people who are more sup-
portive of reducing income inequality are more likely to vote for the radical right than
the center-right. However, this finding did not reach conventional levels of statistical
significance (p < 0.1 in Model 1).
To evaluate how these ideas are put into practice, the paper now turns to examine
some of the most successful radical right parties’ use of rhetoric. The first case is
the Freedom Party of Austria, which has participated in a number of governments. I
examine the Sweden Democrats afterward, whose electoral success has forced an un-
easy alliance between the social democrats and the bourgeoise parties. The final case
study is the Danish People’s Party, which has also supported minority governments
and whose membership included MPs that had defected from the Social Democrats. I
have selected these cases because they each represent an unexpected instance of radi-
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cal right ascendancy. These countries have low levels of income inequality, high levels
of ethnic homogeneity and strong universal welfare states, in defiance of theories of
economic vulnerability and ethnic competition. These are also cases with large radi-
cal right parties, making them crucial cases for social scientists to better understand.
The success of the radical right parties in these countries makes them more relevant
than parties that only garner one percent of the vote. While there are certainly other
large radical right parties in Europe (notably the National Rally in France or Lega in
Italy), the cases I have chosen enable me to isolate a smaller number of variables to
follow. By exploring these three cases, this paper will show that not only are radical
right voters motivated by euroskepticism and welfare chauvinism, but also that the
radical right parties recognize this and utilize these appeals to garner more support.
Austria
The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) was a longstanding agrarian party that only
assumed its radical right character in the 1986, when Jörg Haider became the face of
the party. Austria was governed for decades by a grand coalition headed by the Social
Democratic Party and the center-right People’s Party. This arrangement meant that
policy was very stable and it created the impression that the two mainstream parties
had converged (Art, 2011). This created an opening for the FPÖ. Using strong anti-
immigrant rhetoric, the FPÖ had built up a poor reputation in the international
arena. Playing off cultural tensions between Slavs and ethic Germans, the FPÖ
members railed against the “barbarism of the Slavs” (Art, 2011). Of course, like
the rest of the radical right parties, Islam had a central space in the rhetoric of the
party. Muslim immigrants were denigrated as belonging to an utterly incompatible
culture and were accused of draining the welfare state and economic opportunity.
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Jörg Haider, a major figure within the FPÖ declared that it was a travesty that
300,000 Austrians are out of work, while there are 300,000 immigrants working in the
country (Zaslove, 2004).
Appealing to working-class voters, the FPÖ was brought to government as a
junior-coalition member of the People’s Party. This drew the ire of the international
community, resulting in EU sanctions against Austria for its inclusion of a party like
the FPÖ (Zaslove, 2004). It also gave the FPÖ the opportunity to enact some of its
political platform.
After decades of social democratic governance, the center-right began to imple-
ment a series of welfare reforms once it was able to form a government with the
FPÖ. Unemployment benefits were restructured so that single-parents would receive
reduced benefits. Even more drastically, the coalition government eliminated unem-
ployment benefits for seasonal workers (Heinisch, 2003). However, the FPÖ insisted
on the creation of new programs. At the same time as their government was recom-
modifying the unemployment insurance system, the FPÖ ministers were implement-
ing a cash benefit for women with children.
Ultimately, the FPÖ did not have a particularly successful term of office. They lost
just under 17 percent of the voteshare between 1999 and 2002, cutting their vote total
to less than half of what it had been (Carr, 2014). A combination of self-destructing
politicians, mixed with involvement in incredibly unpopular reforms proved harmful
to the success of the party. However, despite this setback, the party has returned to
high levels of support following the economic crisis.
Once back in power, the FPÖ returned to its welfare chauvistic agenda. In 2017,
the FPÖ rejoined the government as a junior coalition partner to the ÖVP. The party
is an avid user of Instagram and regularly posts official campaign advertisements,
which provides a window into their rhetoric. These advertisements frequently put
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welfare chauvism front and center.
Figure 3·6: Freedom Party Instagram, 2018 (Freedom Party of Aus-
tria, 2018)
One such ad features a cartoon of a young muslim woman thinking to herself
about how she’s losing her mind now that social benefit cards include photo identifi-
cation. This advertisement is a reference to a story about how an ethnically Turkish,
Austrian woman fraudulently claimed e50,000 using her deceased mother’s benefits
card (Freedom Party of Austria, 2018). This is not a story about cutting benefits per
se, but rather about preventing people from exploiting a system intended to protect
those that deserve it. The fine line between making it harder for people to access
62
benefits with outright cuts is made more clear when the political party is actively
working to expand benefits (to some). This distinguishes the welfare chauvinism of
the radical right from the welfare queen narratives that have been commonly used by
mainstream right politicians.
This combination of expanding benefits and excluding immigrants is precisely the
approach taken by the FPÖ. The Freedom Party also promoted the success of their
ministers in creating new social programs. Minister of Social Affairs Beate Hartlinger-
Klein implemented paternity leave bill that guaranteed leave as a statutory right. The
Freedom Party promoted this policy on their social media platforms.
The advertisement claims that paternity leave is available for everyone from this
point forward. This policy serves a dual role for the radical right. It helps put money
in the pockets of families that want to spend more time raising their children, and it
also helps invigorate declining fertility rates, a concern for many ethno-nationalists.
One other notable feature of both of these advertisements is the party slogan that
appears in each. “Die Soziale Heimatpartei” literally translates to “The Social Home-
land Party”. Heimat is similar to the concept of the fatherland, carrying all of the
same nationalistic baggage. The Soziale Heimat construction boils down the party’s
message to its core and the phrase comes as close as you can to welfare chauvinism,
while still being a catchy slogan.
The FPÖ has used its cabinet portfolios to advance a welfare chauvinist agenda
during both of its periods in government. When it deviated from this message, as it
did with the welfare reforms in the early 2000s, it was punished by the electorate. The
partnership between the ÖVP and the radical right has often put the FPÖ in a tight
spot, where their coalition partner insists upon spending cuts that fundamentally
contradict their own political branding.
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Figure 3·7: Freedom Party Instagram, 2019 (Freedom Party of Aus-
tria, 2019)
Sweden
Radical right populism did not become a force in Sweden as early as in neighboring
countries. Where the Danes had a radical right party in the 1990s, the Sweden
Democrats did not have a significant effect until nearly a decade later. Radical
right parties had little influence in Sweden between the 1970s and the early 2002s.
Generally speaking, people perceived Sweden as a tolerant and welcoming place for
immigrants. A brief (and small) flash party, called New Democracy, emerged (and
vanished) in 1994, but it was mostly inconsequential. The newer and more successful
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Sweden Democrats have campaigned on reducing immigration, particularly Muslim
immigration, law and order, and welfare chauvinism. However by 2006, the political
landscape had changed and the radical right had their breakout performance. The
Sweden Democrats won their first elections on the municipal level. This was all
occurring in the context of significant economic and social changes. Unemployment
is no longer at 2 percent and the once homogeneous country currently has a foreign
born population of 14.4 percent (OECD, 2014).
The Sweden Democrats, while outspoken on issues of immigration, have often tied
economic arguments to their rhetoric. The cultural arguments against immigrants are
related to their appeals for social protection for native Swedes. Rather infamously, the
Sweden Democrats created a campaign advertisement for the 2010 that was removed
from the airwaves because the television station considered it hate speech (Der Spiegel,
2010). The advertisement featured an elderly woman (who is walking with the aid
of a walker) approaching a social services counter, while a large group of burqa-clad
women run past her pushing baby carriages. The cultural arguments are clear in
the advertisement, but there is also an explicit focus on the economic risk to native
Swedes that immigration poses.
The Sweden Democrats have shrewdly used media to garner international atten-
tion and these public displays reveal their policy priorities. Having had previous
advertisements pulled from television for being offensive, the party devised a way to
get the media to cover their extreme rhetoric without having to pay for ad space in
the expensive Swedish media market. In the midst of the Syrian refugee crisis, the
Sweden Democrats distributed a missive ostensibly to refugees who made their way
to Greece, warning them that Sweden is home to growing amounts of gang violence
and that refugees will be sent away (Taylor, 2015). While the letter is supposedly
written to deter refugees from coming to Sweden, it is quite clear that the Sweden
65
Democrats had a different audience in mind with their letter. The letter, written in
English, would not be of much use to a Syrian refugee living in Greece. The real
message is for Swedes (most of whom speak English), who the Sweden Democrats re-
mind that Sweden now has to “borrow money to provide education and basic health
care” because of budgetary constraints. They also do not appear to be above simple
flattery, telling Swedes that they are “friendly, generous, and hardworking” (and can
be those things while simultaneously deporting refugees and offering them squalid
conditions) (Taylor, 2015). It is telling that the letter addresses how the wealth and
welfare of Sweden has vanished well before it mentions how Swedish culture is not
amenable to Islam. Threats to the welfare state are front and center in the Sweden
Democrat’s political rhetoric.
Despite the growing popularity of the Sweden Democrats, the mainstream parties
have maintained their cordon sanitaire, or political quarantine, on the party. The
Sweden Democrats have increased their vote-share in each election since 2006 and
the electoral system is reaching a breaking point. After earning 12.9 percent of the
vote in 2014 neither of the mainstream parties could form a coalition large enough
to form a majority government (Carr, 2014). The Social Democrats formed a mi-
nority government with a coalition of Greens and the Left but after the national
budget failed a parliamentary vote, Prime Minister Löfven threatened to called a
snap-election for March 2015 (SverigesRadio, 2014). The crisis was resolved when
the center-right parties signed an agreement with the Social Democrats to support
each other’s budgets in the event of minority governments. This prevented a snap
election where the Sweden Democrats could have gained further ground. Assuming
that the radical right can maintain their current vote share, these sorts of uneasy
arrangements between the traditional left and right could become the new normal.
Furthermore, this consensus may allow the radical right to position itself as the only
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alternative available.
As things stand in Sweden today, the mainstream parties have forged a strong
consensus on a number of issues. They are united in maintaining the cordon sani-
taire, excluding the Sweden Democrats from government. They have readjusted the
economic cleavage around a more neoliberal center creating an opening for the radical
right to contest this issue. Finally, neither party has (as of yet) attempted to co-opt
the anti-immigrant agenda of the Sweden Democrats. The strong political consen-
sus in Sweden that once brought harmony has recently been a source of tension and
radicalism.
Denmark
The Danish People’s Party (DF) came to prominence in the mid 1990s and quickly
became a major force in politics. Much like the FPÖ and the Sweden Democrats,
the DF emphasizes the risk that Muslims poses to society. In addition to policies
limiting immigration, they also have incorporated welfare chauvinistic appeals to
their rhetoric. This formula has been tremendously successful at capturing ex-Social
Democratic voters. If you look at the data, the DF is more of a “worker’s party” than
the Social Democrats; in 2001 56% of DF voters were working class, in contrast to
the 43% of voters for the Social Democrats (Minkenberg, 2009). The DF has not only
been successful among Social Democratic voters, Morgens Camre, a Social Democrat
MP, defected to the DF, humiliating the party (Rydgren, 2010).
MP Camre provides an illuminating example of the type of rhetoric employed by
the DF. “The influx of people from abroad will destroy the welfare state: Denmark
has become an insurance company where all are compensated without ever having to
pay the insurance premium; such an insurance company will fall” (Rydgren, 2004).
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The DF keeps advertisements it’s used in the past on their website, which provides
a window into how they use certain ideas. One of the most common issues their
advertisements tackle is the European Union. Surprisingly, many of the euroskeptic
advertisements make no mention of the free movement of people.
Figure 3·8: Danish People’s Party Billboard, 2012 (Christensen, 2012)
Figure 3·8 is a billboard found in Gladsaxe, Denmark. The advertisement reads
“Ask the People” and demands a referendum to leave the EU. The billboard does not
evoke immigration and instead focuses on the EU crushing Denmark, suggesting a
violation of national sovereignty. In pamphlets and more text heavy advertisements,
the DF rails against the EU for meddling in the Danish minimum wage, opposes
Eastern European immigration as a job killer, and accuses pro-EU politicians of
wanting to replace the national currency with the euro (Dansk Folkeparti, 2012a,b).
This discourse demonstrates how the DF operates in a policy space encompassing
68
both cultural and economic issues. The DF leveraged this type of rhetoric to gain
newfound influence in 2001.
The Social Democratic Party was in government from 1993-2001. During its
tenure it had undergone a major transformation of the welfare state in Denmark.
Under the leadership of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, the Danish welfare state’s mantra
transitioned from social democracy to flexicurity and while flexicurity has become the
darling of many a policy analyst, the transition to it represented a neoliberal shift as it
resulted in benefit cuts for a number of people. The Rasmussen government reduced
the generosity of many benefits, most notably early retirement and unemployment
(Arndt, 2013). These changes in benefits were accompanied with the implementation
of active labor market policies that put new requirements on unemployed people.
Overall, the effects of these changes to the welfare state resulted in a significant
amount of recommodification.
The rightward shift of the Social Democrats created an opportunity for the DF.
In 2001 the Social Democrats were not rewarded for their efforts at reform; they lost
control of the government, not to mention many seats in the Riksdag to the DF. Many
of these voters that moved to the DF were once strong social democrats. The only
political party that was not involved in the Andersen government but still rhetorically
supported the working class person was the DF (Arndt, 2013).
After gaining so many seats in 2001 the DF played a pivotal role in the government
of Anders Fogh Rasmussen from the Liberal Party. While not formally part of the
government, the DF held the key votes in the parliament that kept the center-right
government operating. This cooperation was in exchange for policy influence, which
enabled the DF to get the anti-immigration policies it had campaigned on. However,
the DF committed itself to voting for the government’s economic platform, which was
decidedly neoliberal. The recommodification of Denmark continued under Anders
69
Fogh Rasmussen, which made the DF complicit in the liberalization effort (Koisiara-
Pedersen, 2012). In the following election, the DF had lost ground, as shown on Figure
3·1 at the beginning of this chapter. Their electoral losses were primarily among
blue-collar workers, dissatisfied with the party’s continuation the Social Democrats’
retrenchment program (Koisiara-Pedersen, 2012).
The success and failures of the DF can be traced to the politics of the welfare
state. When it grew, it was because other parties cut the welfare state and when it
declined, it was because they had supported government cuts. The visible transition
of former social democratic politicians and voters demonstrates how these economic
issues are incredibly relevant to the success of the DF.
Discussion
This paper set out to measure the characteristics of radical right voters in Europe.
First, I identified the individual level factors that characterize their supporters. Being
young and male both made someone more likely to support the radical right over the
mainstream parties. Lower trust for national legislatures and the European Union also
were significant predictors for voting radical right. Stronger anti-immigrant beliefs
also motivated radical right voters. Finally, having lower income was associated with
support for social democrats and the radical right and made one less likely to support
the mainstream right.
Euroskepticism was a prime factor in both the analysis of radical right voters
and radical right parties. In the quantitative portion, I controlled for anti-immigrant
attitudes and yet euroskepticism was a statistically significant factor in support for
the radical right. In the qualitative portion, campaign advertisements criticized the
EU without any allusions to free movement of people, immigration, or refugee policies.
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The case studies demonstrated that euroskepticism is a politically salient belief that
radical right parties try to harness, proving that these positions are a significant part
of their agenda and that this component should not be discounted by researchers.
Taken together the quantitative and the qualitative portion show that euroskepticism
is an independent motivator of radical right voters and not merely a manifestation of
anxiety over immigration.
Though the results were mixed across the models for support for social spending,
the case studies confirmed the importance of welfare spending in the radical right
agenda. For all their distrust in government, these are a group of voters who desire
the government to intervene in the economy to reduce redistribute more money to the
poor (native born citizens). The parties themselves advocate for pro-natal policies
and increasing pensions for the elderly, despite the fact that their voters tend to be
younger. Their agenda is welfare expansionist, but exclusionary. This fact distin-
guishes radical right parties from center right conservatives that have worked to scale
back the welfare state for decades. Though both party families seek to add additional
burdens on applicants, there is a clear pattern of radical right parties pushing for
expansions of social welfare programs and where they held power, like in Austria,
actually following through and doing so.
These results reconfirm some of the literature’s prior findings, but also challenge
other results. Yes, completely unsurprisingly, radical right voters have a worse percep-
tion of immigration compared to both center-left and center-right voters. This finding
was never realistically in doubt, however, not only was euroskepticism as important a
motivator as immigration, but we see from the case studies that euroskepticism is not
merely a dog whistle for anti-immigrant views. While the free movement of people
within Europe and European refugee policies connect the politics of immigration and
the EU, anti-EU campaigns address a broader political-economic set of issues. So one
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of this paper’s contributions is demonstrating that euroskepticism is crucial to the
support of the radical right even when controlling for anti-immigrant values.
The prognosis for economic vulnerability arguments are not so good. For starters,
radical right voters are not any worse off than social democrats based on the cross-
sectional data. The idea that the worst impacted individuals are turning to the radical
right is not supported by the data. Furthermore, countries with strong universal
welfare states have not been immune to the dramatic growth of the radical right.
Social Democratic havens like Sweden, Denmark, and Austria all have major radical
right parties that have played an ever-growing role in politics. Certainly, this study
benefits from the availability of more recent data over these earlier projects that have
emphasized economic vulnerability and the potential benefits of a universal welfare
state.
The convergence of the European radical right to this euroskeptic/pro-welfare/anti-
immigrant agenda indicates a strategic movement of a party family to more favorable
position. The change over time has been dramatic. This change is particularly stark
in countries like Denmark, where the radical right originated as a tax-revolt party in
the 1970s. From that period they have committed growing attention to expanding
the welfare state to better appeal to a working-class demographic.
Understanding the basis of support for the radical right has important implications
for European party systems. A model of radical right parties that solely focuses on
immigration will fail to predict growing support for them during times of economic
recession or when immigration is otherwise less salient. After the Eurozone crisis,
when economic issues became more central in the minds of most voters, the radical
right actually gained vote share across Europe. Furthermore, a superior understand of
euroskepticism as a political force is newly relevant in the wake of Brexit. The success
of the Leave campaign is best understood from a perspective that goes nativism and
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has a more nuanced understanding of the euroskepticism that led 51.9 percent of the
British electorate to vote Leave.
For future research improved data is needed to be able to make stronger claims.
While surveys have began asking about welfare chauvinism, the questions currently
fielded are not precise enough to get at the entirety of the phenomenon. Knowing
whether people who favor cutting benefits to immigrants would rather spend the
money to increase the welfare of natives instead of using it to pay down the debt
or some other policy goal would be able to distinguish between welfare chauvinism
and welfare exclusion more generally. Additionally, more data on the issue priority
of radical right voters is crucial. Without this information we cannot know for cer-
tain whether people are voting based on their welfare chauvinist ideas. This measure
has been included in many surveys but not alongside the “if the election were held
today” question for a cross-national sample. Substantively, the austerity programs
implemented by the vast majority of European governments in the aftermath of the
economic crisis provide a window into the effects of social spending cuts on the po-
litical support of the radical right. A more systematic effort at building a database
of welfare state retrenchment would allow for a quantitative study to test the effects
of retrenchment on public opinion or vote share for the parties in government.
Additionally, the cause of the leftward economic shift of radical right parties is
vitally important but remains unexplained. The quantitative portion of this study
looks at data from a single year, and as a snapshot in time it is unable to measure
change, but knowing when the radical right moved left and how its voters changed
over time are important puzzles to unpack. It remains to be seen the extent to
which the radical right’s movement is a triangulation, in response to a neoliberal
shift from the other parties, notably social democrats. Abu-Chadi et al. (2020) argue
that large parties move in response to issue salience and take more publicly popular
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stances, while smaller parties move to create distinctions between themselves and
large parties to carve out a niche for themselves. However, this account struggles to
address the unpopularity of welfare state retrenchment and the mainstream consensus
around austerity. Further research is needed to understand if the supply or demand
side of the equation is moving the policy positions of radical right parties.
Electorally, the radical right has been significant because it has helped prop up
minority governments or have forced uneasy grand coalitions. These tenuous govern-
ments have provided the radical right a growing role in the policy process and have
reshaped the immigration agenda in Europe. Continued study is becoming even more
important as we reach a point where radical right parties are garnering the plurality
of the vote in some polls in Europe (YouGov, 2016; BVA, 2016). Increases in radical
right group activity and grisly violence against minorities underlines the magnitude
of the situation (The Guardian, 2015, c.f). It has become quite clear that the radical
right has advanced beyond the status of “flash party” and has reshaped European
party systems by adopting an issue-set that cuts across the previous alignment. Sim-
ply attributing the phenomenon to immigration would be a misdiagnosis and given




A Tale of Two Crises: The Supranational
Determinants of Social Pacts in Europe
Introduction
In the 1990s, when national governments in Europe needed to make major reforms to
meet the Maastricht Criteria necessary to join the Economic and Monetary Union,
many countries turned to social pacts. These agreements between business, labor,
and government emerged so that countries could meet Maastricht targets for infla-
tion, debt, deficits, exchange rates, and interest rates (see Perez (2000)). These
agreements continued to be used by countries in the European periphery as a form
of macroeconomic management in the following decades, and yet in the midst of the
Eurozone Crisis, social pacts declined in use (Visser, 2013). This paper sets out to
explain why this tool fell out of favor in a time where macroeconomic adjustment was
both vitally important and otherwise constrained.
Social pacts enable governments to manage their economy under new circum-
stances where they have ceded control of monetary policy to the European Central
Bank, and fiscal policy is constrained by the EMU guidelines on deficits and debt.
Social pacts aren’t just a tool for social democrats; the agreements can have either ex-
pansionary or austere goals making them viable options for governments of all colors.
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Despite becoming ubiquitous in countries like Spain and Ireland, after the Eurozone
crisis these tools were left on the shelf unused by their governments. The consensus
among researchers is that in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis social pacts were
used less across the region as a whole (see Visser (2013)). However, a more fine
grained analysis presents another puzzle. Italy, following the Eurozone crisis, increas-
ingly used social pacts in an effort to manage the economy, whereas Ireland saw a
major decline in social pacts.1 What explains the divergent paths taken by Italy and
Ireland?
The existing literature offers a number of different explanations for social pact
formation and decline. These debates focus on domestic political characteristics like
the strength of labor unions, the party affiliation of the head of government, or the
political weakness of national governments. A second string of arguments focus on
economic conditions like unemployment and inflation. I present a third argument,
supranational politics determine whether social pacts are pursued by national gov-
ernments.
I hypothesize that while the EMU led to the emergence of social pacts in the Eu-
ropean periphery, today it is the cause of their decline. I certainly do not claim that
domestic factors are unimportant, but I argue that the supranational politics of social
pacts explain when national governments are willing to come to the negotiating table.
Conditional loans from the Troika2 provide an acute example of supranational pres-
sure on national governments. Emergency funds from the Troika come with strings
attached in the form of policy prescriptions. These structural reforms emphasize
liberalization of the economy.
1See Table 4.1 for the percentage of years with social pact negotiations before and after the crisis
for selected countries
2The Troika refers to the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, which collaborated and issued emergency loans to countries in fiscal crisis.
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I argue that supranational pressure reduces social pact negotiation in three ways.
The first mechanism is structural reforms liberalizing the economy and reducing the
institutional power of the social partners. The second mechanism is the reduced ma-
neuverability of governments that accept conditionality. The terms of the agreement
are not flexible enough for the government to bargain with the social partners. The
government’s bargaining position is ossified by requirements imposed by the supra-
national entity to the point where negotiation is less likely to succeed. The third
main mechanism is the creation of additional avenues for blame avoidance tactics.
Governments will often use social pacts to get buy-in from the social partners on
politically unpopular reforms to help them sell the changes to the public. Having
reforms imposed by the IMF or the EU gives governments someone to displace blame
onto for the reforms. For example, SYRIZA in Greece has mastered railing against
the Troika, while fulfilling the terms of their conditional loan. Through these three
mechanisms, what was once the catalyst for concertation has become an impediment
to social pacts.
I test my own hypotheses and those of the existing literature using a nested anal-
ysis following Lieberman (2005). This mixed-method approach combines a large-N
analysis with a small-N qualitative analysis to leverage the strengths of both ap-
proaches. Using a logistic regression model, I test my hypothesis and the competing
arguments from the existing literature, including the role of the national economy, in-
stitutional factors, and partisan politics. The key finding of the quantitative analysis
is that being on the euro makes a government less likely to negotiate social pacts. I
also find that economic factors from the existing literature do play an important role
in social pact negotiation, especially inflation and growth rates. However, arguments
regarding partisanship or minority governments do not stand up to scrutiny. Neither
of these factors had any effect on social pact negotiation.
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In the second component of the nested analysis, I take the findings from the quan-
titative analysis and present a pair of case studies to reveal the mechanisms underlying
the causal relationship. I selected Ireland and Italy as my two cases because these two
countries differ on the primary dependent variable from the quantitative analysis, pact
negotiation. Italy has had more pacts negotiated since the crisis and Ireland fewer.
Though both countries are in the Eurozone, which I establish reduces pacts, they had
divergent outcomes. The nested analysis identifies that these countries had different
sorts of pressure applied to them by the EU and this produced distinct political con-
siderations for these two countries. The distinction between implicit conditionality
and formal conditionality explains why Italy is an outlier for negotiations.
Italy can be thought of as being under implicit conditionality; though it did not
have a formal memorandum of understanding from an international entity, the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) put a tremendous amount of pressure on Italy, including
secret correspondence that outlined explicit policy prescriptions and a timeline to
implement the reforms. Implicit conditionality is based on an implicit understanding
between two parties with mutually understood rewards or consequences based on the
actions of the subordinate party (Sacchi, 2015). Implicit conditionality does not in-
volve a formal written agreement, but nevertheless comes with clear expectations of
what the subordinate party is to do. Though pensions, employment protections, and
labor markets were all reformed according to a neoliberal vision, Italy’s implicit con-
ditionality gave its governments more flexibility to negotiate than Ireland. However,
in the end ECB pressure ended those negotiations in multiple circumstances. Italy’s
implicit conditionality put it in a rather unique situation, particularly in comparison
to the other countries most affected to the crisis, which received formal conditional
loans from the Troika. This explains why Italy stands out from other countries and
increased post-crisis negotiations.
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Unlike Italy, Ireland received a formal conditional loan that gave its government
much less flexibility to negotiate. Formal conditionality, as imposed on Ireland, in-
volves a binding memorandum of understanding between the two parties, where the
subordinate party agrees to make a number of prescribed policy reforms in exchange
for loans or aid (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004). These required reforms of-
ten request labor market liberalization, debt reduction, and cuts to the public sector.
The direct influence of the ECB in Ireland’s decision to request a bailout, along with
the austerity program imposed by the Troika, show why the politics of crisis are no
longer about deliberative social concertation and are now unilaterally undertaken by
national governments.
I begin this paper by defining social pacts, distinguishing them from other forms
of concertation, and providing historical context regarding their use. The paper pro-
ceeds with a literature review that provides a brief outline of the major theories that
predict when a government will pursue a social pact. I will be presenting arguments
about economic shocks as the impetus for social pacts, domestic electoral politics
and institutions, industrial relations and finally supranational influence. I move on
to explain my methodological choices and data sources. Next, I discuss the results of
my logistic regression model. The paper then moves to its case studies where Italy
and Ireland’s social pact experiences are analyzed with special attention to how the
supranational forces influenced national politicians’ decision-making. The paper con-
cludes with a summary of my findings and the implications of these results for social
pacts in an era of transnational economic governance.
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Social Pacts
This section sets out to provide the necessary background information regarding social
pacts. I begin by defining social pacts and describing their key functions. This section
will establish social pacts as a distinct form of concertation. I will then move on to
giving a brief history of the emergence of social pacts and their decline following the
Eurozone crisis.
Negotiations between the social partners take many forms and have various levels
of institutionalization, so it is important to precisely define what I mean by social
pacts and to distinguish it from other common forms of dialogue. I follow the Euro-
pean Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound)
definition, which defines social pacts as having three characteristics: (1) Governments
call for the negotiations and invite the social partners, (2) a social pact is a bipartite
or tripartite agreement between them, and (3) social pacts are not formally institu-
tionalized, and they require that the groups agree to participate, which is not a given
(Eurofound, 2019). When I say that they are not formally institutionalized, I mean to
say that these agreements are irregular. Governments convene negotiations as a need
emerges and while these agreements became used with some frequency, they are not
the default. Most often these agreements are tripartite, but occasionally rather than
ending negotiations, governments will conduct them with just one social partner, if
the other declines to participate. Social pacts tend to cover multiple policy areas, but
frequently involve wage restraint, welfare cuts, and liberalization of labor markets
(Avdagic, 2011).
Social pacts and other forms of concertation like neo-corporatism differ in both
form and function. The primary structural difference is that neo-corporatism is a
formally institutionalized system and does not require the state to initiate negoti-
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ations. This is clearly the case where bipartite deals between business and labor
are made without the government, but even tripartite councils in countries with
neo-corporatism are lasting bodies rather than ad hoc negotiating teams (Eurofound,
2019). There is also a historical difference between the two systems. Neo-corporatism
embodies a compromise, exchanging wage restraint for full employment and a gener-
ous welfare state, whereas social pacts have been designed to reign in welfare spend-
ing, wages, and interest rates. These forms of concertation, while involving the same
actors have had applications and levels of institutionalization.
Social pacts are also distinguished from neo-corporatism based on the countries
that use them. Table 4.1 shows the countries that most frequently used social pacts
and the percentage of years covered by a pact for the pre and post crisis periods.
There is significant regional clustering, with social pacts being favored in Southern
European countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece and in other important
instances in the European periphery more generally, including Ireland and Estonia.
Neo-corporatism is favored by Northern European countries, notably, Denmark, Swe-
den, and Germany. I will delve more into the reasons for this regional divide in the
literature review, but suffice it to say now that there is a regional clustering to social
pacts and they were primarily found in Southern Europe.
The scholarly consensus points to the Economic and Monetary Union as the cata-
lyst for social pacts in Europe(Perez, 2000; Hancké and Rhodes, 2005; Hassel, 2003).
The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, created economic targets that members had to
reach in order to join the EMU, known as the convergence criteria (Council of Euro-
pean Communities, 1992). Reaching targets on inflation, deficits, exchange rates, and
interest rates was onerous, particularly for countries in Southern Europe. The con-
sensus among economists in the late 1980s and early 1990s was that a tight monetary
policy would be enough to tackle wage inflation, but the decentralized bargaining
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Table 4.1: Top EU Countries by Pact Negotiation, 1996-2014
Country 1996-2014 1996-2007 2008-2014 Difference
Portugal 10 negotiations 58.33% 42.86% -15.48%
Finland 9 negotiations 58.33% 28.57% -29.76%
Estonia 7 negotiations 41.67% 28.57% -13.10%
Italy 7 negotiations 33.33% 42.86% 9.52%
Slovenia 6 negotiations 50.00% 0% -50.00%
Ireland 6 negotiations 33.33% 28.57% -4.76%
Luxembourg 6 negotiations 25.00% 42.86% 17.86%
Netherlands 6 negotiations 25.00% 42.86% 17.86%
Romania 5 negotiations 33.33% 14.29% -19.05%
Bulgaria 4 negotiations 16.67% 28.57% 11.90%
Note: Bolded countries had more pacts in the post-crisis period. Source: Visser
(2013)
system made it impossible for employers to fend off wage demands (Perez, 2000).
However, the possibility of being excluded from EU membership was dire enough and
this put tremendous pressure on European countries to meet these economic targets
(Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). Southern European countries like Spain and Italy
both used social pacts as a way to organize bargaining and reduce wage inflation,
while also making significant welfare reforms, particularly to pensions (Perez, 2000).
These changes to industrial relations were not just a temporary response to the
immediate demands of the convergence criteria, these countries continued to use pacts
well after the initial shock that created them. Though fragile and contingent upon
the willingness of the government and social partners to participate, social pacts did
become an informal default option for these countries for some time (Avdagic et al.,
2011). The use of pacts did evolve over time — Spain shifted to bipartite deals (Molina
and Rhodes, 2011), Portugal shifted to more narrow deals (da Paz Campos Lima and
Naumann, 2011) — but pacts continued to be used in a number of countries long
after the initial push for EMU.
In 2010 when the Eurozone Crisis was in full swing, governments responded with
austerity programs that slashed social programs, cut public sector jobs, and raised
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taxes (Blyth, 2013). Rather than coordinate with the social partners more govern-
ments went ahead unilaterally with these reforms. Overall pacts declined since the
crisis (Visser, 2013). The decline of social pacts, at a time when they could be eco-
nomically beneficial, is the central paradox that this paper sets out to answer. In
the next section, I review the explanations presented by the literature. These ex-
planations include my hypothesis that the supranational influences have led to the
decline of social pacts and also competing explanations that I will test alongside my
hypothesis in the quantitative analysis.
Literature Review
Economic Shocks
In the run-up to EMU a great deal of scholarly attention was devoted to social pacts
for the first time. The burden of economic reform and adjustment required buy-in
from the social partners for the government to garner necessary support. Authors
like Perez (2000) and Hancké and Rhodes (2005) find that EMU convergence drove
countries like Spain and Italy to adopt social pacts. Prior to these initial pacts, some
policymakers believed that in the context of tight monetary policy and decentral-
ized bargaining wage inflation could be prevented without government action (Perez,
2000). They quickly learned that this was not the case and determined that through
concertation could they achieve their macroeconomic targets. EMU convergence was
not as challenging for all member states, with the neo-corporatist countries perform-
ing better along these economic indicators, and so the impetus for major restructuring
of industrial relations in the form of social pacts was not there in many cases (Hancké
and Rhodes, 2005). Where the pressures to change where most acute, Southern Eu-
rope, social pacts took off. Even before EMU, European countries had already began
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to move toward concertation. Baccaro and Lim (2007) find that is was the 1987
economic crisis in Ireland and the threat of IMF intervention that brought about the
formative Irish social pacts. These empirical studies have shown that the impetus for
early social pacts was the need to make major economic adjustments.
The economic shocks that promote concertation are not always so grand or rare
as EMU convergence. High levels of unemployment is enough of a motivation for a
government to propose a social pact, though it has little bearing on the success of the
negotiations (Castater and Han, 2016). Martin (2000) finds that social pacts do re-
duce unemployment at the national level, though may also have a beggar-thy-neighbor
effect on other EU members. Since most EU trade occurs between EU countries, wage
restraint makes countries more competitive vis-a-vis other EU competitors, who in
turn may have worse economic outcomes as a result.
Inflation is unlikely to be a problem in the time period under examination. The
ECB board has overseen a strict monetary policy and this has slowed inflation relative
to earlier periods. Overall, inflation in the European countries has been declining
since the 1980s (OECD, 2014). That being said, high inflation is a problem that
can be addressed by wage moderation. Do governments use social pacts in these
circumstances or do they allow unemployment to force wage moderation?
At the end of the day these arguments boil down to economic problems driving
governments to propose social pacts. I expect that inflation, and unemployment
would produce economic stress and result in social pact proposals.
Hypothesis 1 High levels of unemployment will increase the odds of a social pact
being proposed




While the economic “problem-load” of the 1990s is often cited as a catalyst for the
emergence of social pacts, it is not a sufficient condition for concertation. Regardless
of the economic troubles a country faces, social pacts will only emerge under specific
conditions. For a social pact to be appealing the government must be weak (Avdagic,
2010). Baccaro and Lim (2007) also find that weak governments are more likely
to support social pacts, especially when presented with a major political-economic
crisis. Here, a weak government refers to minority or caretaker governments. Without
a majority or electoral legitimacy a government is more likely to rely on the social
partners. This reduces the risk that unions will bring down a reform, and helps
provide legitimacy to a proposal by incorporating key stakeholders.
Weak governments, either those without a majority or those threatened by an
opposition, are more likely to utilize social pacts to reduce blame. This model assumes
that unions are able to mount strong enough opposition that they possess a veto on
potential reforms so they must be incorporated. However, Baccaro and Lim (2007)
do note that once institutionalized, social pacts endure despite declining unionization
rates and collective bargaining decentralization.
To what extent do social pacts match the politics of corporatism? Martin and
Swank (2012) find that party systems determine the extent to which countries adopt
corporatism. Two-party systems did not provide incentives to governments to dele-
gate power to the social partners. Single party control of the government provides
opportunity for unilateral actions. Multiple party systems with coalition govern-
ments produce incentives for right-wing politicians to delegate political decisions to
corporatist channels where business is guaranteed a privileged seat at the table. For
business, the alternative to working with unions was watching center-left coalitions
85
enact policies without consulting business so corporatism was attractive (Martin and
Swank, 2012; Swenson, 1991).
Historically, social pacts have been tied to welfare state retrenchment and the pol-
itics of cutting the welfare state vary by party system. Governments have turned to
social pacts during crises in order to prevent wage growth, cut government spending,
and implement structural reforms. The politics of these types of reform are dramati-
cally different for majoritarian systems compared to two party systems. Powell and
Whitten (1993) find that voters have an easier time assigning blame for unpopular
reforms in majoritarian systems. When one party controls the reins of power, ac-
countability is clear and transparent. This finding is supported by Pierson (1994),
who argued that retrenchment in the United Kingdom under PM Margaret Thatcher
was limited because of its majoritarian system of government. Pierson (1994) found
that the opaque separation of powers system in the United States allowed for blame to
be displaced and by paradoxically the centralization of power in the United Kingdom
made it harder for the Conservative Party to enact sweeping reforms of the welfare
state. Pierson (2001) argues that cutting the welfare state is an exercise in blame
avoidance and through this lens the appeal of social pacts become apparent. Social
pacts help protect governments from the political fallout of cutting the welfare state
(Hamann and Kelly, 2007). These majoritarian systems that have greater need for
blame avoidance, tend to also not have formal neo-corporatism, which is why ad hoc
pacts are valuable. Unlike majoritarian countries, consensus systems have will often
have negotiations between the left and the right for major reforms to the welfare state
as seen in the Swedish pension reform (see Anderson (2001)). Consensus systems with
many political parties already have structures in place to avoid blame for politically
unpopular reforms that are deemed necessary, which do not exist in majoritarian sys-
tems. These differences leads majoritarian countries to stand to benefit more from
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social pacts and so I expect that as the number of effective parties decreases, social
pacts increase.
Social pacts do not operate the same way as neo-corporatism, neo-corporatism
was developed around a mutually beneficial compromise, whereas social pacts have
emerged from government demands for retrenchment. Neo-corporatism has emerged
in countries with multi-party systems (Martin and Swank, 2012). Majoritarian sys-
tems on the other hand have a greater political need for blame avoidance because
of the clear accountable of single-party majoritarian government. This has led many
two-party system countries to pursue social pacts as a means of blame avoidance. For
example, Ireland and Spain both operated as two-party systems (despite proportional
representation in Spanish elections). Furthermore, countries with multiparty systems
as explained by these authors have mostly adopted neo-corporatist structures that
provide an institutionalized way for the social partners to be incorporated in decision-
making. I hypothesize then that the lower the effective number of parties in a country,
the more likely they are to pursue a social pact.
Though majoritarian systems may have additional political need for additional
blame avoidance techniques, it is historically clear that not all majoritarian systems
use social pacts to the same degree. In fact, many majoritarian systems are pluralist
as Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) found. The social partners in pluralist countries like the
United Kingdom or the United States have less direct involvement in the policymaking
process. I now move on to discuss the role that unions play in the development of
social pacts, which helps to clarify the distinctions between different majoritarian
systems.
Hypothesis 3 Weaker governments are more likely to use social pacts than strong
governments that may not need it.
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Hypothesis 4 Governments in countries with fewer effective parties are more likely
to negotiate social pacts.
Labor Unions
Rather than looking at the government as the source of the change to pacts, some
scholars have considered changes in labor as a potential cause. The political power
of labor unions was of crucial importance to Baccaro and Simoni (2008). They ar-
gue social pacts succeed when governments are weak and when unions have suffered
recent losses. Unions that have suffered losses but still possess strong organizational
capacities are crucial because they remain valuable partners and are more likely to
accept concessions. A union with a stronger position may not be willing to make a
deal on contentious political issues. That being said, where unions no longer can pro-
duce a realistic threat to the legislative process social pacts will be unlikely(Baccaro
and Simoni, 2008).
Culpepper and Regan (2014) argues that unions in the periphery of Europe have
lost their traditional power. With evidence after the 1974-2003 period that Baccaro
and Simoni (2008) study, Culpepper and Regan (2014) find that unions have lost this
structural power and no longer provide a veto on important legislation. They speak
of carrots and sticks, referring to influencing public opinion and threats of strikes.
These powers are diminished and Culpepper and Regan (2014) find that unions are
treated just as another interest group, no longer a privileged partner.
The very same characteristics that drove the Varieties of Capitalism literature to
label Southern European countries “mixed market economies”, namely fragmented
labor unions, have been found to be a cause of successful social pacts. In a sort of
“goldilocks” logic, these countries have middling levels of unionization and this actu-
ally contributes to social pacts being proposed. This finding is supported by Hassel
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(2003), who finds that countries with a middling amount of collective bargaining cen-
tralization will produce social pacts. Countries that were highly coordinated or highly
unregulated were better able to respond to market pressures, but the countries with a
mixed model struggled to prevent wage inflation, maintain low interest rates, and cut
debt (Hassel, 2003). Social pacts became a solution to radical unions and helped bring
economic change. Castater and Han (2016) separate proposals from signed pacts and
find that moderately centralized unions result in more proposals being made, but
centralized unions and employers produce more successful pacts. This helps explain
the high rate of failure of social pacts.
Hypothesis 5 Proposals are more likely in countries with middling levels of union-
ization.
Partisanship
Though I have discussed the role that political conditions and institutions constrain
governments, there is a body of literature that considers the partisan composition
of governments as a key factor in determining when social pacts are used. Even in
countries structurally predisposed to social pacts at times when concertation would
be beneficial, there are still failures or unilateral government actions (Hamann and
Kelly, 2007). This can be explained by the partisan control of government. Conser-
vative parties have less to gain electorally because their supporters are less supportive
of concertation and these parties are less ideologically invested in pacts. Ultimately,
whether or not a government supports a social pact is related to their interpretation
of its electoral value. Long-term studies show that social pacts are significantly asso-
ciated with left-governments and that the more seats left parties have in government,
the more likely a social pact is agreed upon (Ahlquist, 2010).
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Italy is held up as an example of partisanship’s influence. Concertation in Italy
ebbed and flowed in accord with the electoral success of Berlusconi (Molina and
Rhodes, 2007). When Berlusconi was out of office, concertation was utilized by the
left and technocratic governments of the 1990s. Berlusconi favored unilateral action
and did not consult with unions.
While the Italian case indicates some role for partisanship, studies on European
social pacts have found that partisanship isn’t significant in the outcome of a deal.
In fact the case against partisanship has been so overwhelming that reviews of the
literature have mentioned partisanship only in passing and only to dismiss the notion
that it matters anymore (see Molina (2002)). In a neoliberal era, the content of
social pacts are on issues that have cross-party support, but where the parties are
looking to escape blame from unions (Molina, 2002). Nevertheless, I test the theory
of partisanship by including a hypothesis that social democratic governments increase
social pacts, though I am skeptical of this hypothesis and do not expect a significant
finding.
Hypothesis 6 Social democratic control of government increases the likelihood of
pacts being negotiated.
Supranational Influence
The first social pacts came about from the pressure of joining the EMU and there is
a body of literature that continues to find the determinants of social pact negotiation
in supranational forces. Based on this literature, I hypothesize that there are three
mechanisms through which the supranational organizations influence social pacts.
Firstly, supranational institutions like the European Central Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund leverage their financial power to extract policy changes.
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Research on austerity and the bailout programs provide myriad insights into supra-
national influence. Studies that consider the role of the IMF have emphasized its
neoliberal tendencies. The IMF has imposed policy prescriptions through conditional
loans according to the Washington Consensus (Blyth, 2013). Under this consensus
the IMF has pushed for deregulation of labor markets, privatization, and austerity
programs to the detriment of debtor nations. Picot and Tassinari (2017) show that
countries not under IMF conditionality took less orthodox approaches to austerity,
and could implement reforms at their own discretion.
However, new research has painted a different picture of the IMF. Broome (2015)
finds that the IMF has evolved in many policy areas; privatization and deregulation
have been deemphasized by the IMF in the aftermath of the Euro-crisis, in favor
of a more precise focus on a broadened tax base and fiscal restraint. Ban (2015)
argues that the IMF has been more permissive of program countries using stimulus
programs than during past crises. IMF working papers have suggested increasing
corporate taxes rather than consumption or payroll taxes benefits economic growth
(Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo, 2012). The IMF has taken a less hardline stance even
on capital controls (Moschella, 2014). This literature indicates that the IMF has not
been the primary motivator for austerity reforms in program countries, which leads
us to examine the role that the EU has played in this phenomenon.
Leaders in the European Council were a driving force behind the harsh terms of
the rescue packages. Schmidt (2020) finds that leaders doubled-down on deficit and
debt rules and created new oversight mechanisms — the European Semester — and
penalties for non-compliance. This by-the-book approach was followed because of
concerns, particularly in Germany, over moral hazard and the possibility that other
countries may follow in Greece’s footsteps, if they believed that they too would get
bailed out (Schmidt, 2020).
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In countries without formal memoranda of understanding, the European Central
Bank exercised influence in other ways. Sacchi (2015) argues that they came under
what he calls “implicit conditionality”. Policy demands were made of countries like
Italy and Spain, in exchange for continued financial support from the ECB. If the
government failed to implement the reforms, they were made to understand that they
would be forced to accept a formal conditional loan from the Troika (Sacchi, 2015).
The EU was able to extract policy concessions from both program countries and non-
program countries that were at risk of insolvency. This inflexibility limits the ability
of national governments to effectively negotiate a social pact. Indeed, Beazer and Woo
(2016) find that stricter conditionality arrangements impeded structural reforms in
post-communist countries because it limited the ability for domestic politicians to
build a consensus among vital stakeholders. Strict arrangements prevent any mean-
ingful bargain from being struck and when the Troika put conditionality on countries
there would be no room for stakeholders to negotiate a social pact.
Secondly, the European Union, and euro membership in particular, service as
a useful target of redirected blame. Just as opposition parties and the govern-
ment blame each other at the national-level, domestic governments can take ad-
vantage of the multilevel governance system and shift blame to the European Union
(Heinkelmann-Wild and Zangl, 2019). The tendency is for national governments to
redirect blame to European officials, particularly in areas where the EU has more
policymaking power. Heinkelmann-Wild et al. (2020) relate this to asylum and bor-
der policies. Countries under conditionality are similarly subordinate to European
policymakers and would transfer blame to the EU. Most importantly, Heinkelmann-
Wild et al. (2020) find that national governments are most likely to place blame on
European institutions, when the national government is responsible for implementing
European policies. Welfare state retrenchment is among the most politically costly
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action a government can take and so the likelihood of blame being redirected to an-
other entity would be high. As mentioned before, social pacts are a useful blame
avoidance tool, but the Europeanization of policymaking has created an additional
blame avoidance tool that may have lessened the political need for social pacts.
The literature leads us to two hypotheses about the causes of social pact decline
post-2008. First countries under explicit conditional loans are less likely to have
a social pact. The rigidity of these agreements should constrain governments and
prevent pacts from being pursued. Also, these memoranda of understanding (MoUs)
are public and highly visible so they enable politicians to displace blame to the Troika
and may have less need for social pacts. My 8th hypothesis recognizes the influence of
implicit conditionality and the pressure that can be placed on any Eurozone member,
even if they have not accepted a formal conditional loan. We can expect that Eurozone
members will have fewer pacts than countries with their own currency.
Hypothesis 7 Conditional loans from international institutions decrease the likeli-
hood of a social pact being signed.
Hypothesis 8 Being a member of the Eurozone decreases the likelihood of a social
pact being negotiated.
Nested Research Design
I have taken a mixed-method approach and created a nested analysis. Following
Lieberman (2005), I start with a large-N analysis to test my hypotheses and the
prevailing arguments relating to social pact negotiation. The results of this model
were used to narrow the scope of the small-N case study analysis and also motivated
case selection. This approach combines the strengths of each approach and allows this
study to make generalizable claims, while also revealing the underlying mechanisms
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behind the causal relationship. The results show that the Eurozone is a significant
factor in the decline in social pact negotiations. This insight guides the subsequent
examination of the two cases, Italy and Ireland. Since the case studies are informed
by the quantitative analysis, I reserve a more thorough discussion of my choices with
regard to case selection till after the presentation of the quantitative results.
Quantitative Model Specification
Using Jelle Visser’s Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), I have constructed a logit
model that predicts whether or not a pact is negotiated in a given country-year.
The population under consideration is all EU-28 countries from 1994-2014 (with the
exception of Iceland and Croatia because of missing data). With the remaining
countries, I have a viable n of 443 country-years.
Using a logit model, I predict the likelihood of a social pact negotiation based on
a series of different variables. The main dependent variable in the model is whether
or not a pact is negotiated in a given country-year. This binary variable only reflects
whether or not the parties are at the negotiating table and does not require that
any deal actually be signed. A multitude of variables can intervene to prevent the
social partners from reaching an agreement but a proposed social pact reflects the
desire of the government to engage in concertation. In times of higher inflation and
low unemployment, unions are in a position where they may not be willing make
concessions and focusing solely on successful negotiations would hide the motivations
for pact-making. On the other hand, during a recession pacts are more contentious,
potentially making failure more likely. Operationalizing the dependent variable this
way will allow this paper to ascertain the extent to which the independent variables
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influence the desire for a pact without having to get bogged down with the nuances
and challenges of a successful negotiation.
The first independent variable is growth rate, which I take as a measure of eco-
nomic crisis. Lower levels of economic growth are an impetus for government interven-
tion in the economy. I expect that lower levels of growth will be associated with more
government involvement in industrial relations. A secondary measure of economic
crisis will be changes in unemployment levels. I am using change in unemployment
because different countries have come to accept different levels of unemployment, but
changes in unemployment are a strong motivator to act. Social partners negotiate
with national conditions in mind, so rate of change is more relevant to their decision-
making than absolute values. This operationalization helps evaluate countries with
chronically high unemployment. These variables will test the economic shock litera-
ture’s predictions.
A second set of variables are intended to test the effects of international pressure
on the formation of social pacts. Pulling data from the IMF, I have created a binary
variable for whether or not a country is part of a loan agreement with the IMF in
a given year. These loans come with political riders that require domestic reforms
in exchange for the money and I believe provide a chilling effect on social pacts. I
have targeted, specifically, loans provided through the Extended Fund Facility (EFF)
program at the IMF. These loans are longer term and as a result include structural
reform requirements. The loans provided to Ireland and Greece following the crisis
(alongside other countries throughout the panel) were of this variety. I have also
included a binary variable for whether or not a country is a member of the Eurozone
in a given year to identify if that has distinct effects beyond EU membership.
Union strength posed a problem to proxy. Measures like union density don’t tell
the whole story; France, for example, has low union density, however, its collective
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bargaining coverage is high because agreements cover non-unionized shops. Variables
like collective bargaining coverage have ambiguous causal directions because social
pacts may be producing high levels of collective bargaining coverage. I use the cate-
gorical variable from the ICTWSS for coordination of wage bargaining as a proxy for
the degree of corporatism. It is measured on a five point scale ranging from firm level
bargaining (1) to wage maximums and minimums set by national agreement (5). The
extent of corporatism is an important control as the literature indicates that social
pacts are primarily used by countries with intermediary amounts of corporatism as
a replacement for strong and organized social partners. This tests the hypotheses
relating to union strength. Middling values are more desirable for social pacts ac-
cording to this theory. I operationalize this using a dummy variable, where guideline
bargaining is the middling value.
In order to test party system effects, I ran models using both effective number of
parties and change in the effective number of parties, following a similar logic that
I applied to unemployment. Countries with many political parties have a different
equilibrium but increases in the ENP is a shock to the system and weakens existing
coalitions. These more vulnerable coalitions will theoretically be more supportive of
having social partners share in policy. Minority governments have been coded on a
binary scale based on data on the seat share of the government from the Database
on Political Institutions (Cruz et al., 2016).
Results
What factors influence whether or not a government seeks to negotiate a social pact?
Table 4.2 reports the coefficients and standard errors of my logistic regression model
predicting whether or not a negotiation takes place in a given country-year.
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The economic variables produced results in line with my expectations for the most
part. Economic growth was significant at the 0.05 level. At lower levels of growth
a social pact negotiation was more likely. Inflation had a similar effect. Higher lev-
els of inflation drove governments to the negotiating table with the social partners.
Though social pacts are able to affect labor market dynamics, the results show that
spikes in unemployment did not motivate additional negotiations. It is quite clear
that unemployment is not a policy issue that governments seek to handle using con-
certation. These results support Hypothesis 3, inflation was a significant predictor of
negotiations. On the other hand, they provide no support for Hypothesis 2 because
changes to unemployment did not significantly impact the likelihood of a negotiation.
Though national economic conditions affected the likelihood of negotiations, chang-
ing domestic political conditions were less impactful. Negotiations were not affected
by fluctuations in party systems, or by what party was in government. Nor were
minority governments any more likely to use social pacts to legitimize their policy
agenda. Of particular note is the fact that all levels of collective bargaining central-
ization had no significant variation. The coefficients in Table 2 for these variables
represents their difference from the base category, which is firm level bargaining.
These findings were surprising given the plethora of domestic factors cited in studies
that consider individual cases. Yet in the aggregate, I find no pattern emerging with
regard to domestic political factors. Hypotheses 4, 5, 6 , and 7 correspond to these
theories and I fail to reject the null hypothesis for all four theories.
Finally, I arrive at the international variables. Countries receiving an IMF loan
were not more or less likely to negotiate social pacts than other countries. These loans
have been cited by authors that claim that the IMF has put pressure on governments
to enact neoliberal structural reforms in exchange for loans. And yet countries receiv-
ing loans through the Extended Funds Facility, which requires structural reforms in
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return for medium-term support from the IMF were not dissuaded from negotiating
social pacts.





































Akaike Inf. Crit. 399.555
Note: Country fixed effects excised from table ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
While the IMF loans did not have a significant effect, the ECB did have a chilling
effect on social pact negotiations. Eurozone members were less likely to negotiate a
social pact than non-members. The p-value on this finding is 0.051. I can therefore
say with a great deal of confidence that the Euro changes domestic political decision-
making with regard to social pacts.
To further illustrate this effect, Figure 4·1 is a plot of the probability of a negoti-
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Figure 4·1: Social Pact Negotiation in Europe
ation at different levels of GDP growth for Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. 3
During a recession where there are prolonged periods of zero GDP growth, non-Euro
countries are 2.63 times more likely to negotiate a social pact. This result indicates
that while European countries used social pacts to meet the Maastricht criteria, EMU
has led to this macroeconomic tool being left under-utilized. It is worth emphasizing
here that the economic effects of the Euro on inflation, unemployment, and growth
are controlled by this model and there remains a significant connection between being
on the Euro and not negotiating with the social partners.
Returning to my hypotheses one final time, the results find support for Hypothesis
1. Countries that have joined the Eurozone are less likely to negotiate a social pact
than non-members. While Eurozone countries were much less likely to negotiate a
pact, I find no significant evidence that IMF conditional loans reduced social pacts.
Hypothesis 8 has failed to reject the null hypothesis that IMF loans do not matter.
3Baseline values in predicted probability model are either the mean for continuous variables or
mode for categorical variables unless otherwise described herein.
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The period of time since 2008, when the Eurozone crisis hit was tested as a control
variable. Though the decline in social pacts has occurred since 2008, I have managed
to account for this change through the independent variables in the model (inflation
and GDP growth, for example). This means that there is not any significant latent
effect explaining the decline of social pacts in this time period.
The results of this logit model indicate that something is pushing Eurozone coun-
tries away from social pact negotiations. However, this model does not explain the
core empirical puzzle of this paper: Why did Italy see more pact negotiation when
Ireland did not? The paper now transitions to the second component of the nested
analysis, which sets out to explain how the Eurozone reduces pacts and to resolve the
unusual case of Italy.
Nested Case Study Analysis
The results of the quantitative analysis show that social pact negotiations were de-
creased by participation in the euro. Given this finding, the next crucial step is to
understand precisely how the euro causes fewer social pacts to be negotiated. With
that goal in mind, the paper turns now to identify the mechanisms by which euro
membership influences domestic political decision-making. I hypothesize two distinct
mechanisms lead Eurozone countries to eschew social pacts during the Eurozone cri-
sis: (1) providing fiscal aid conditional upon structural reforms, and (2) enabling
domestic politicians to transfer blame for unpopular reforms to supranational enti-
ties. The case studies will examine the role that each of these mechanisms played for
the two countries.
My case studies are intended to provide model-building small-N analysis, following
Lieberman (2005). Since there are unaddressed theoretical and empirical questions,
100
particularly, why Italy negotiated more pacts following the crisis despite being in the
Eurozone, additional theoretical development is needed. The remaining variable that
went untested in the large-N analysis is the type of pressure applied by the European
Union. Implicit conditionality is difficult to measure in a large-N analysis because
of data availability. Since implicit conditionality happens behind closed doors, in
smoke-filled rooms, rarely is information regarding it made publicly available. This
limits the ability to test theories relating to implicit conditionality as part of a large-N
quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, distinctions between implicit and explicit condi-
tionality change the political considerations of national government. The qualitative
analysis centers on the mechanisms of EU leverage over Eurozone countries including
both implicit and explicit conditionality and the responses of national governments
to these pressures.
My case design is a on-the-line/off-the-line design. Ireland was selected as a case
that is well explained by the large-N study. Italy is the off-the-line case that requires
further explanation because Italy increasingly used pacts since 2007. Italy is an un-
usual case because most of the known instances of EU pressure have been formal
conditionality. Greece, Ireland, and Portugal all received conditional loans from the
Troika that required policy concessions in exchange for funding. Italy’s implicit con-
ditionality was not widely applied and I hypothesize that this form of conditionality
does not reduce pact negotiation because it comes without a built-in blame avoidance
opportunity. Ireland is a more typical model of EU intervention and was forced into a
formal agreement with the Troika, which came with contractually binding obligations.
Italy faced implicit conditionality, and this difference in circumstances provides an
important contrast to understand how different forms of conditionality induce com-
pliance. The variation in EU pressure will reveal any potential differential effects
that the two types of conditionality may have. This nested analysis will show the
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mechanisms by which the EU influences social pact negotiation and further develop a
theory of supranational power. I begin with the Italian case and move on from there
to address Ireland.
Implicit Conditionality and Flexibility in Italy
This section examines Italy’s history of social pacts, following the Maastricht Treaty.
I find evidence that Italian politicians do deflect blame to the European Union when
possible and that because of implicit conditionality Italian politicians had the ability
and political need to negotiate social pacts.
Social pacts in Italy were something of an unlikely success story. Unions peak
associations in Italy are notoriously divided by ideology and this internal division
complicates the process of speaking with a single voice. The modern story of Ital-
ian social pacts begins in the early 1990s during the effort to meet the Maastricht
convergence criteria.
Prior to the emergence of social pacts in Italy, unpopular reforms struggled to
pass because of strong political opposition from labor unions. Though pensions had
already just undergone a reform in 1992 under PM Amato, Silvio Berlusconi’s new
center-right government set out to take further action. While the Amato reform
focused on future retirees, the largest losers of Berlusconi’s plan were those about to
retire. This demographic also happens to be one of the unions’ largest base of support
in Italy (Natali and Rhodes, 2004). In October 1994, the unions organized massive
strikes in opposition to Berlusconi’s pension reform (Guardian, 2003).
Berlusconi also found opposition from within his own government. His coalition
with Lega Nord was strained by the proposed reform. The early retirement pensions
hit by the Berlusconi reform disproportionately impacted northern Italy, which was
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Lega Nord’s electoral core. Disputes over the pension reform ultimately led to Lega
Nord leaving the coalition and bringing down Berlusconi’s government (Ferrera and
Gualmini, 2004). Protests and internal dissent resulting from a lack of consensus
caused Berlusconi’s government to fall.
A technocratic government replaced Berlusconi and it was much more amenable
to social pacts because it was essentially unelected and was seeking support from
the social partners. This is when social pacts began in earnest. Though pension
reform proved perilous for the previous government, Dini was not deterred; in fact,
Dini had been the architect of Berlusconi’s failed plan. Learning from the failures
of Berlusconi’s reform effort, Dini’s government followed a more inclusive approach
and brought the social partners into talks on pension reform. The key to success in
negotiations was delaying the effects of the reform. Older pensioners would not be af-
fected by the changes (Regini and Colombo, 2011). Consequentially, the distributive
costs of the reform were put on younger voters and labor market outsiders rather than
on middle-aged union members. This enabled both the unions and Lega Nord to be
brought onboard. The unions agreed to transition from a defined benefit pension sys-
tem to a defined contribution. This change effectively eliminated seniority pensions.4
The deal was put to a vote among union members who overwhelmingly supported the
reform (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004). This compromise approach enabled significant
reforms to political sensitive programs.
The next major wave of social pacts in Italy was driven by the demands of join-
ing the EU. Joining the EU had economic requirements that necessitated politically
unpopular reforms, but the government achieved them using a combination of social
pacts and blame redirection. Prodi was responsible for navigating the EMU acces-
4Seniority pensions enabled workers who made 35 years of contributions to retire regardless of
their age. Early retirement was still possible after the Dini reform, however, benefits would be scaled
down to last for their prolonged retirement.
103
sion process for Italy. The reforms necessary to meet the Maastricht criteria were
significant and Prodi was direct with the public about the reasons for the reform.
Prodi referred to the EU as a vincolo esterno or “external constraint” (Schmidt and
Gualmini, 2013). This added pressure and sense of urgency about the necessity for
reform was enough to bring the unions to the table again to negotiate pension reform.
The pension reform and a special EU tax5 levied on all incomes helped bring Italy
into compliance with the EMU criteria and it was admitted to the EMU in 1998.
The soft influence of the European Union was demonstrated after Berlusconi re-
turned to office in 2001. Initially, Berlusconi took a similar stance to 1995. The
government put out a white paper calling for a retreat from trilateral social pacts and
instead participating in what they called “social dialogue”. Notably this language is
borrowed directly from the European Employment Strategy (Ferrera and Gualmini,
2004; Tiraboschi, 2014). So Berlusconi’s government’s opening salvo against social
pacts was borrowed from EU documents. The next year the government began to
unilaterally implement labor market reforms, which resulted in the left-wing union,
CGIL, to call for a general strike. While the CGIL was strongly opposed to Berlus-
coni’s reforms, the more moderate UIL and CISL unions were more amenable to
changes. Berlusconi changed course slightly and agreed to negotiate with UIL and
CISL. The Patto per l’Italia was signed by all of the social partners except the CGIL
and it essentially traded increased labor market deregulation for increased welfare
spending. Even the right-wing Berlusconi made a deal with the unions.
The rest of Berlusconi’s tenure followed a similar pattern. Pacts were signed by
only some of the social partners all the way through 2009. This 2009 pact was the
5This temporary tax was intended to reduce the national debt to 60% of GDP to meet the EMU
criteria. The idea was that the tax though temporary would enable an immediate fix to debt, which
would be easier to handle once EMU helped reduce the cost of debt servicing for Italy (Ferrera and
Gualmini, 2004)
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last one before the Eurozone crisis took hold. This pact linked wage increases to
European inflation instead of Italian inflation and increased the duration of collective
bargaining contracts to 3 years. However, after the crisis hit unilateral change once
again became the government’s favored approach.
In 2010, government decree 78 froze wages for the next four years and put a
moratorium on collective bargaining. Furthermore, this decree set out to reduce the
budget deficit to 0 percent by 2014 (Pedersini and Regini, 2013). The unions were
left out completely at this stage as the government grappled with a growing crisis.
As the crisis deepened, the ECB resumes the Securities Market Programme to buy
sovereign debt. On August 4th, the ECB announced that it would be purchasing
Irish and Greek debt. The following day a secret correspondence was sent from ECB
President Jean-Claude Trichet and Governor of the Bank of Italy Mario Draghi to
Berlusconi. The letter notes the government’s effort to produce a balanced budget but
states that “these are important steps, but not sufficient” (Trichet and Draghi, 2011).
Trichet and Draghi go on to not only identify a number of specific policies that they
would have Berlusconi implement, but also provide a timeline for the government to
enact these reforms. The ECB would have Italy pass legislation to achieve a balanced
budget a year earlier than previously proposed, decentralize wage bargaining to the
firm level, liberalize employment protections, and privatize government properties by
the end of September 2011.
If the short deadline did not make it clear enough, the ECB emphasized that it
wanted the government to implement these reforms without additional consultation
with the social partners. Berlusconi was told to implement these changes by gov-
ernment decree and that while policy proposals are under discussion with the social
partners, it is critical for the government to move forward decisively (Trichet and
Draghi, 2011). Whatever Berlusconi’s private response to the letter was, the ECB
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was satisfied enough with his reply to approve the purchase of Italian treasury bonds
through the Securities Market Program just 3 days after their initial letter was sent
(Taylor, 2011).
The Trichet-Draghi letter lit a fire under the government and by October, Berlus-
coni produced a public letter to Brussels outlining all of the specific reforms that he
intended to pursue, largely echoing the prescriptions made by Trichet and Draghi.
However, given the slow progress made by that point, and perhaps Berlusconi’s own
personal reputation, Brussels was not convinced of his sincerity. To instill greater
confidence, Italy invited the IMF and the EC to provide oversight and assess progress
made toward achieving these goals (Sacchi, 2015). Pressure from the EU drove Berlus-
coni to pursue policies that he did not have parliamentary support for and ultimately
caused his government to fall for a second time. And for a second time, Berlusconi
gave way to a technocratic government.
The technocratic government, despite its early overtures to the social partners,
went ahead unilaterally to implement a number of the reforms demanded by the EU.
Mario Monti used his keynote speech as he became Prime Minister to assure the public
that he would consult with the social partners and that his reforms would not impact
existing, long-term employment contracts (Sacchi, 2015). That public promise did
not survive the year as Monti’s first major decree was unilaterally devised and made
dramatic changes to pensions. The Save Italy Decree, as it was known, included 30
billion Euros in budget cuts and new taxes. The decree raised the retirement age for
women in the private sector to match the public sector, which was one of the many
policy prescriptions enumerated in the Trichet-Draghi letter.
Despite the behind the scenes pressure from the EU, subsequent reforms by Monti
did involve negotiations with the unions. After the pension and budget changes, the
government turned its attention to labor market reforms. The goal of the negotiations
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was the reform of Article 18 of the Worker’s Statute, which allowed employees to sue
for wrongful termination and to potentially be reinstated at their old job (Pedersini
and Regini, 2013). The onus was on the employer to demonstrate that the rationale
for firing the employee was legitimate. This served as the third rail of Italian politics
for decades and unions vigorously defended this protection. The proposal that Monti
brought to the unions was two-fold. First, the bill would prevent fired employees
from being reinstated. Instead, workers that were wrongfully terminated would be
paid a cash settlement. Second, the bill would expand unemployment protections to
compensate for the decrease in employment protection from the first change. Op-
position from the CGIL and the slow-moving nature of the negotiations caused the
government to pull out of talks and start moving the proposal through the legislature
(Pedersini and Regini, 2013).
These labor market reforms were pushed by the EU. When the government pro-
posal was announced, the EU Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate wrote a
private memo calling for Italy to not water down the reform. “While it is very positive
that the draft reform proposal by the government builds on a constructive dialogue
with the social partners, it is crucial that the objective and degree of ambition of
the reform remain commensurate to the challenges of the Italian labour market, in
line with the Council recommendation” (Sacchi, 2015, quoted in). The bill eventually
did get held up in the parliament and slight adjustments were made to make it more
palatable to the left. Exemptions were created for people to be reinstated if the cause
of their dismissal was extremely invalid. This instance showed the EU’s opposition
to continued negotiation with the social partners. The EC had essentially told Italy
that it did not have any flexibility in its bargaining position.
Italy’s history of social pacts has the mark of European intervention upon it.
While social pacts in Italy had a renaissance of sorts because of the pressure to reform
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to meet the Maastricht criteria, European officials subsequently indicated that the
government should move unilaterally and not deliberatively. The coerced adherence
to specific reforms came without any explicit memorandum of understanding like a
troika loan would have and yet the political and economic pressure exerted by the
ECB shaped the direction of Italian public policy for multiple governments. Though
several Italian governments tried negotiating with the social partners following the
crisis, those efforts failed because of the constrained bargaining position they were
put in by the EU.
The Sudden Stop in Ireland
This section addresses the politics of austerity in Ireland following the 2008 crisis. I
focus on the hypothesized mechanism of Eurozone influence on social pacts, namely,
blame avoidance and coercion through conditionality. I find that Irish politicians were
compelled to accept specific reforms and they used visibility of European pressure to
deflect blame for the economic austerity program.
The crisis in Ireland was a major tipping point that turned the country away from
social pacts. In September 2008, the housing bubble had burst and Irish banks were
in danger of bankruptcy. In response, Ireland backed all the liabilities of the banks
(Financial Times, 2009). This left Ireland on the hook for an enormous sum of money.
In 2007, government debt to GDP was at an all time low of 27.5 percent, but by 2011
that number had skyrocketed to 111.7 percent and continued to rise (OECD, 2019).
The financial crisis managed to suck most of the air out of policy debate.
In 2009, the government tried to bring the unions on board for a major austerity
package. The Fianna Fail government and the Irish Business and Employer’s Asso-
ciation (IBEC) wanted to pursue internal devaluation and came to the negotiating
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table looking to not just freeze wages but actually reduce them (Dukelow, 2015). The
Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), the peak association for organized labor, was
obviously opposed to such a proposal (Raidió Teilif́ıs Éireann, 2010). While negoti-
ations continued, the government passed an emergency budget in March to address
the crisis. The emergency budget cut public sector wages among other things. This
aggressive budget, which cut e4 billion from the budget was called the ”last big
push” by Finance Minister Lenihan (Dukelow, 2015, quoted in). Despite the govern-
ment unilaterally cutting wages in the middle of an incomes policy negotiation, talks
continued between the social partners.
Despite setback, negotiations persisted. The government despite moving ahead
unilaterally on major cuts was still motivated to reach an agreement on additional
changes. A deal was looking likely late in 2009. The ICTU and the IBEC were
coalescing around a furlough for federal employees. The deal would protect wages
and employment while providing temporary budgetary relief for the government. The
government rejected the proposal, pulled out of the negotiations, and unilaterally
enacted a law on wages (Regan, 2012). This breakdown in talks meant that for the
first time since 1987 Ireland’s labor market was not covered by a social pact.
Unsatisfied with the previous negotiations, the government decided instead to fo-
cus on bilateral deals with just a segment of the labor force. In March of 2010, the
government and public sector unions signed the Croke Park Agreement. This deal
essentially kept wages from being cut in exchange for public sector layoffs. It also
required adjustments to the public sector in line with the new public management
approach (Regan, 2012). Despite the smaller scope of the deal, the agreement demon-
strated that the government was still willing to negotiate with the social partners.
The success of the Croke Park Agreement was a short-lived resurgence of pacts
because the economic involvement of the EU redirected Ireland toward a unilateral
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approach. While the social partners negotiated austerity deals, the financial sector
was receiving Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) from the Central Bank of Ire-
land. These funds enabled already solvent banks to receive additional funds to help
with liquidity during the crisis. About e50 billion had been allocated to Irish banks
by 2010 (Taylor, 2014). The process is closely monitored by the ECB to ensure that a
national central bank is not undermining the monetary system by propping up failing
banks. In November 2010, a year before the letter the ECB sent to Berlusconi, Trichet
wrote to the finance minister of Ireland with an ultimatum. This secret letter, which
was published years later in the Irish Times, informed Ireland that the ECB would
prevent any further ELA funds from being allocated to Irish financial institutions
unless the government formally requested a bailout package from the ECB, IMF, and
EC (Taylor, 2014). The letter also makes it clear that by accepting such a bailout,
Ireland would be agreeing to fiscal consolidation, structural reforms and financial
sector restructuring. Now to be clear, the sudden stop of ELA funding would cause
a financial collapse in Ireland. There was little room for the government to remain
in the single currency and reject such a bailout given the alternative threatened by
Trichet. With so little room for maneuvering, Ireland wasted no time requesting a
formal bailout from the Troika.
Soon the Troika and Ireland wrote up a memorandum of understanding (MoU)
that outlined the specifics of the conditional loans. The MoU called for specific tax
increases on pensions, the lowering of tax bracket bands, one-time sales of government
assets, and cuts to pensions and other social programs (European Commission, 2010).
The MoU was 18 pages of specific policies to implement over the course of the following
3 years.
From the onset the government way laying blame at the feet of the European
Central Bank. As the government was unveiling the terms of the MoU to the legis-
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lature, Finance Minister Lenihan defended himself from parliamentary criticism that
the government did not share the financial burden with bondholders, saying “There
is simply no way that this country, whose banks are so dependent on international
investors, can unilaterally renege on senior bondholders against the wishes of the
ECB” (Brown, 2010). According to Lenihan, a path forward where bondholders took
a partial loss on their investment was only possible if the ECB supported it. In this
statement, he deflects any responsibility and claims to have no choices available to
him.
Other government figures also placed blame on the Troika for the deal. After his
government fell, Taoiseach Cowen reflected back on the terms of the bailout. Based
on conversations that he had with ECB representatives, there was “no doubt that
burning senior bondholders would mean no EU/IMF programme - it was one or the
other” (Ó Cionnaith et al., 2015). Now since this interview came out years after his
exit from government, it cannot be considered a form of blame avoidance, instead,
perhaps, being some effort at managing his legacy. However, whatever his motivations
for revealing this information, the interview demonstrates the coercive influence that
the ECB had on how Ireland responded to the crisis.
The Irish government continued to enact major austerity budgets without the
social partners, following the demands made by the EU in the Trichet Letter. Leni-
han’s hope that the 2010 budget would be the “last big push” did not pan out, as
the next government budget, the first under the Troika MoU, cut a further e6 billion
from public spending (Dukelow, 2015). This budget was a perfect match with the
conditional loan agreement. It cut the prescribed amount from the suggested areas.
When DG ECFIN was conducting its oversight role over Ireland, it reported that the
government had taken “strong ownership of the goals of the EU-IMF programme’
(DG ECFIN, 2011).
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Of the Troika members, it was the European Commission that Irish bureaucrats
found most demanding. Private interviews with Irish civil servants conducted by
Hick (2018) reveals how Irish officials perceived members of the Troika and their
oversight of Ireland’s structural reforms. These interviews reveal that initially civil
servants were more concerned about the presence of the IMF. One Irish bureaucrat
recalled how the mood of the department would shift when the IMF was visiting and
investigating (Hick, 2018). However, though the civil servants feared the reputation
of the IMF, they claimed it was the Commission that more closely resembled the
strict neoliberal reformer they had worried about (Hick, 2018). This supports the
theory that the IMF has taken a less hardline stance and that is not the major driver
of supranational pressure for austerity.
The crisis provided a serious break in continuity with the past, ending more than
twenty years of continuous concertation. This would be Fianna Fail’s final budget
as the 2012 elections resulted in a historic defeat for the party, and brought the
opposition Fine Gael into power. Leaving government led Lenihan to open up about
the role of the ECB. By his account, the ECB forced Ireland to accept the bailout
and MoU (O’Brien, 2011). Fine Gael, now in office, continued to follow the MoU,
and made no efforts at reintroducing social pacts.
The adherence of the government to politically unpalatable reforms, namely wage
cuts, made social pacts a waste of time and resources. With no union willing to sign
an agreement that codifies wage cuts, the government took unilateral action. These
early austerity efforts did little to staunch the progression of the crisis and eventu-
ally the government was forced into a bailout by the ECB, which gave Ireland little
other recourse. This MoU made the Fianna Fail government commit to further cuts
beyond what they had already just implemented, despite their previous commitment
to no additional large austerity budgets. The government followed the MoU to the
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letter and consequentially had no room to negotiate reforms with the social partners,
especially due to the aggressive timeline.
Irish officials were under formal conditionality and the terms of this agreement
dictates the domestic policy actions taken by successive governments. Up until the
bailout, the government had still been trying to negotiate with the unions, but once
conditionality set in the government opted to move ahead without consultation. In-
stead of redirecting using social pacts to build support for the reforms, Irish officials
emphasized that they were compelled by the EU to implement these austerity budgets
and redirected blame to the supranational level. Having the ability to blame the EU
for the cuts, limited the political need for building consensus, especially when nego-
tiations were ill-fated due to the constrained bargaining position these governments
found themselves in.
Conclusion
These findings provide insight into the role of supranational organizations in domestic
industrial relations. Industrial relations are an area of significant national variation
and most studies have (rightly) focused on national factors. Yet, social pacts are more
flexible tools, very different from formally institutionalized macrocorporatism. These
formal institutions are enduring and have survived the political-economic changes
since the 1980s for the most part. Since social pacts are more ad hoc, they are more
likely subject to changes. The European Central Bank’s involvement in industrial
relations and fiscal policy has been the missing piece of the puzzle for social pact
decline. In public and private correspondence to policy-makers the ECB has urged
decisive action rather than deliberative action. The results of the case studies and
the logistic regression model are in accordance, that the being a member of the euro
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has been an impediment to social pacts.
The case studies reveal just how euro membership has resulted in fewer social
pacts. The first crucial factor was blame avoidance. In both cases, domestic politi-
cians placed the blame for the reforms squarely on the Troika. The austerity budgets
were deeply unpopular and made governments in both countries vulnerable to crit-
icism from the opposition. This resulted in politicians in national governments to
claim they were constrained by the ECB or Europe more generally. By being able
to place blame on the Troika, using social pacts as a blame avoidance strategy be-
came less necessary. Paradoxically, implicit conditionality in Italy limited the blame
avoidance potential of EU pressure. Without a formal MoU, it becomes harder to
publicly blame the ECB for domestic policy decisions. The visibility of European
pressure created more opportunity for blame avoidance in Ireland. This factor cer-
tainly influenced the desire to consult with the social partners in Italy, even though
these negotiations failed because of the constraints upon the government.
The second major mechanism that reduced social pacts was, of course, condition-
ality. The collapse of negotiations or the complete absence of talks in both cases
demonstrates how both explicit and implicit conditionality constrain national gov-
ernments and prevent deliberative action. If a government is committed to a fixed set
of policies by conditionality, there is no room for negotiation, which is the foundation
of social pacts. If unions cannot gain anything from the talks, the ad hoc nature of
social pacts enables them to simply refuse to participate and not lend their legiti-
macy to a government austerity program. Of course, rather than make an overture
and have it declined, politicians can opt to simply move ahead unilaterally as was
the case in both countries. Unilateral action is much more viable, particularly when
public European pressure enables blame transfer.
To understand the changing politics of social pacts, the pressure applied by the
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ECB must be considered as a political process rather than a fixed constraint. Prior
to 2017, the ECB had no written guidelines governing the allocation of Emergency
Liquidity Assistance and yet the decision whether or not to continue to allow national
central banks to aid financial institutions is of paramount importance. In the case of
Ireland, the ECB determined that Irish institutions could not receive any more ELA
without a bailout. That decision is of extreme consequence for social dialogue when
you consider how a MoU constrains domestic policy-makers. Whether or not the
ECB decides to pursue a formal MoU or instead use implicit conditionality, which
afforded Italy some (albeit very limited) flexibility relative to Ireland, is again of
extreme consequence. This flexibility enabled Italian politicians to continue dialogue
with social partners, which explains why Italy spent more time negotiating pacts in
the post-crisis period than the pre-crisis period. These negotiations never became a
finalized pact because of pressure from the ECB to move ahead unilaterally, but it
kept lines of communication open between the social partners and government.
Future research into the decision-making processes of the ECB would provide valu-
able insight into policy areas well outside of the ECB’s monetary policy competency.
Through interviews with domestic civil servants and published documents, it has been
possible to see the role of national and supranational officials, but the ECB has been
more opaque than the IMF or the Commission. Unlike these other institutions, the
ECB did not release quarterly reports, which limits our insight into their thinking
and influence here. Interviews with European Central Bank officials may be fruitful
and could help better understand their role in the process.
While the ECB played a central role in the decline of social pacts, I found no
evidence that IMF pressure was driving countries to avoid pacts, in this and previous
crises in the time period. Despite conditional loans binding the hands of national
governments, they were no more or less likely to go to the negotiating table with
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unions and business. These results indicate that the IMF’s softened public stance
on austerity may have been matched by a behind-closed-doors permissiveness. Alter-
natively, this may also be driven by the fact that because of implicit conditionality
many countries without formal MoUs opted against social pacts. There may be no
difference between program countries and non-program countries because pressure
from the central bank has been applied to many countries on both sides of that split.
Italy avoided a formal MoU but pressure from the ECB did push the government
to go ahead without further consultation with the social partners. Interviews con-
ducted by Hick (2018) reveal that Irish civil servants found the European officials
more demanding than the IMF, who was more agnostic about where the cuts came
from.
The ad hoc nature of social pacts and high profile instances where center-right
governments opposed social pacts have lead some to surmise that partisan control of
the government is significant, however, the evidence does not bear that out. Much
like how macrocorporatism has the support of the left and the right, social pacts seem
to be pursued by the left and the right with equal vigor. In both Italy and Ireland,
center-right governments pursued social pacts. Though Berlusconi’s animus toward
social pacts was so strong that his first government collapsed under the opposition
to his unilateral approach, he was open to social pacts during his second stint as
PM. In Ireland, both major parties can be considered center-right and during the
22 years of uninterrupted social pacts governments of both parties signed deals with
unions. More research is needed to rule out other partisan influences on social pacts.
For example, there are instances where social pacts were signed between business
and government but the unions did not sign the final agreement. It is possible that
center-right governments are more willing to move forward without union support
and consequentially the content of the social pacts pursued by the these governments
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are measurably different.
The fact that Ireland had already begun an austerity regime prior to the Troika
bailout has led some authors to indicate that the international pressure on Ireland was
pushing against an open door (Dukelow, 2015). This seems to be an oversimplification.
Italy, just like Ireland, implemented a number of austerity policies prior to ECB
pressure. This does not change the fact that both countries were driven to accept
reforms that they had not chosen themselves. Irish resistance to the ECB is masked by
the coercion inherent in a conditional loan. Ireland is forced to comply with the deal
to maintain international and market credibility so they executed the MoU faithfully.
Italy on the other hand was only under implicit conditionality and consequentially
had more flexibility to adjust the ECB’s policy prescriptions to national conditions,
and this is why they pursued pacts after the crisis, even if they were destined for
failure.
The other domestic factors really did not fare any better in explaining social pact
negotiations from 1994-2014. Minority governments were just as likely to call for
a pact as a majority government would be. Party systems, while relevant to neo-
corporatism, play no role in social pacts. Italy and Ireland have historically had
very different party systems and yet both have relied on social pacts to address their
economic needs. The motivations for social pact negotiation are not determined by
national party politics.
Few surprises came from the variables related to economic crisis. Low growth and
high inflation were both major catalysts of social pact negotiation. Concerns about
inflation are what sparked the resurgence of social pacts in the build-up to the Euro
so it is unsurprising that it remains a crucial factor through the time period. Interest-
ingly, increasing unemployment did not factor into decision making for government.
While high-levels of unemployment can become normalized in some countries, spikes
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in unemployment would present a political problem for governments, but it appears
that they address these problems more directly. Where liberalizing reforms may be
deemed unpopular and governments would like to gain political support and cover-
age from the social partners, responding to an unemployment crisis is an exercise in
credit claiming rather than blame avoidance. National politicians want to be seen as
doing something themselves for unemployment and prefer to take unilateral action to
address spiking unemployment. How does this differ from inflation and growth, two
areas the government would certainly like to claim credit on? The mechanism here is
not readily apparent. In the case of inflation, national governments have little ability
to handle inflation since monetary policy is being handled by the ECB or another
independent central bank. With limited policy options available, working directly
with the social partners is one of the few remaining options available. It is less clear,
however, why national governments will handle low growth with the social partners
(and not unemployment spikes). If anything unemployment would be more directly
addressed by social pact than growth. A full explanation for the difference here is
beyond the scope of this paper, but different political prioritization of these problems
must be part of the puzzle.
Going forward, the literature can be advanced by taking a more focused look on
the qualities of social pacts instead of aggregating them together. Not all social pacts
are created equal. Italy saw several social pacts signed without the participation of
unions following the crisis. Pacts on wage increases in Spain don’t have the same
politics as a pact to enact structural reforms in Greece. Understanding the politics
of social pacts has never been more important in an era where fewer policy options
are available for national governments in times of crisis. While the ECB has taken
monetary policy out of the hands of national governments, this study has revealed
the way that it also constrains what is possible through concertation with the social
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partners. What was once the driving force for a new period of social coordination,
has now become a straightjacket for governments looking to employ social dialogue.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion: Domestic Politics in a
Changing World
The welfare state and centralized industrial relations have been major forces that
counteracted income inequality in liberal democracies. Their decline has coincided
with the recent increase in inequality across advanced-industrialized countries. This
dissertation set out to explain the causes and political consequences of the liberal-
ization of welfare and industrial relations. The EU has used its power to promote
welfare state retrenchment and decentralization of wage bargaining. The European
Union put pressure on euro members to commit to austerity and to move ahead uni-
laterally to enact these budget cuts without the social partners. In particular, the
decline of social pacts can be traced to the direct and indirect effects of the EU’s
influence. Th EU played a critical in how domestic governments responded to the
crisis. The approach of the EU has exacerbated existing uneasiness about the role
of supranational entities in politics. Backlash to the EU has bolstered support for
radical right parties. Their nativist and inegalitarian vision has gained in power since
the crisis in no small part because of EU backlash.
The growing influence of supranational entities in domestic politics has tipped the
balance away from responsive government. As national governments become more
constrained and unpopular policies have become common, understanding how voters
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react to political parties that go against public opinion is more important than ever.
I found that party reputations shape how voters actually perceive these policies.
Voters’ perceptions of the party making the proposal influences how supportive of
the policy they are, independently of their personal partisanship. Not only does this
reputation inoculate parties from the public’s ire, it can actually make their proposal
more popular compared to other parties. On the other hand, associating an untrusted
party to the proposal made people even less supportive of cuts to the welfare state.
Whether trust or distrust wins out varies from country to country, suggesting different
national models rather than a single universal dynamic.
This chapter proceeds with a summary of this dissertation’s main theoretical and
empirical contributions. After this, I identify areas for future research based on the
findings. Finally, I conclude with my thoughts about the future and the next major
crisis to befall Europe, the Coronavirus pandemic.
Supranational Power in Domestic Politics
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated the importance that the European Union has played
in domestic politics. The single currency has given European bureaucrats in the Eu-
ropean Central Bank and the European Commission newfound influence in domestic
fiscal policy of nation-states. The Stability and Growth Pact subjects countries to
scrutiny and presses policy prescriptions upon them. I show that this pressure is not
just applied to countries under a formal memorandum of understand with the Troika.
Countries like Italy that were not requesting a bailout were still subject to direct de-
mands for policy concessions in exchange for financial assistance. The countries that
were subject to implicit conditionality did not have the same blame avoidance oppor-
tunities because the pressure from the EU was behind closed doors and delivered in
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private letters. Without the visibility of EU demands, national politicians had less
opportunity to displace blame onto the EU for the cuts and they had to accept the
blame themselves or else risk the economic consequences of the ECB discontinuing
financial support.
These countries under implicit conditionality had just as little room for maneu-
vering as did countries under formal memoranda of understanding. Italy enacted
the reforms demanded by the EU, but it also tried to bring the social partners into
talks to build support for the reforms. Without public pressure from the EU, Italian
politicians attempted to negotiate social pacts to mitigate the political harm from
unpopular structural reform. Eventually, pressure from the EU ended the negotia-
tions before the social partners reached an agreement, and the government moved
ahead unilaterally. Euro membership permits supranational influence in policy areas
where nations are expected to exercise their own judgment, even in countries that are
not receiving a formal bailout. This power was used to push countries to liberalize
industrial relations, cut social spending, and shrink the public sector.
The unpopularity of the European Union was a significant factor in the support for
the radical right, even before the Eurozone crisis escalated. This study confirmed the
conventional wisdom that anti-immigrant attitudes were a strong motivator for radical
right voters, but it also found a significant, independent effect for euroskepticism. A
person with anti-immigrant beliefs were over four times more likely to support the
radical right if they also were opposed to the EU. Rather than being a secondary issue,
euroskepticism is a major factor explaining radical right support among voters. The
electoral success of the Brexit campaign is proof enough to demonstrate the broad
appeal of euroskeptic beliefs. Strangely, while elections for the European Parliament
remain second-order national elections, the EU has become a larger national political
issue in several countries. The leader of the radical right National Rally, Marine
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Le Pen, was quick to congratulate British Prime Minister Boris Johnson for Brexit,
declaring “it is possible to leave the European Union” (Zaretsky, 2016). Given how
close to power prominent euroskeptics have been, it seems unlikely that the EU will
fade as a domestic political issue anytime soon.
Issue Ownership and Deficits
Chapter 2 revealed that it is not just the message that matters in the politics of
retrenchment, the messenger also influences the outcome. However, the response to
the messenger varies by country. I argue that voters in a country either respond ac-
cording to issue ownership or issue deficits. In the United Kingdom voters responded
to the issue deficits of parties, meaning they viewed proposals less favorably if they
came from parties that cut the welfare state. In Sweden, voters preferred proposals
from parties that expanded the welfare state over those of parties that cut programs,
in accordance to the issue ownership theory.
The distinction between ownership and deficits is a novel contribution and has
important implications for our understanding of retrenchment. The core logic of issue
deficits is that people tend to feel loss more acutely than gains and will remember
them for longer. As the Russian proverb goes, “A spoonful of tar spoils a barrel of
honey”. This simple axiom has significant implications. The existence of issue deficits
has important political consequences that differ dramatically from the expectations
of the traditional issue ownership hypothesis. Social democratic parties’ cuts to the
welfare state are not necessarily more popular and their history of supporting social
programs will not always buoy an unpopular cut. The negativity bias associated with
issue deficits suggest that compensating for retrenchment with expansions in other
areas will do little to repair a tarnished reputation. The experiment that I conducted
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revealed that though the Labour Party had a mixed record of supporting and cutting
the welfare state, it actually had a statistically significant negative effect on support
for a proposal in some policy areas. In this case, it also seems that adding a spoonful
of honey to a barrel of tar does little to improve the taste.
The experiment presented in Chapter 2 tests how partisan cues influence respon-
dents’ opinion of hypothetical welfare cuts. The results in the U.K. and Sweden di-
verged. The United Kingdom showed evidence of issue deficits and Sweden behaved
according to issue ownership. Different political logics prevailed in each country, this
finding stands in contradiction to two important bodies of literature, the New Politics
of the Welfare State and the traditional Issue Ownership approach. Though both of
these theories expect national variation, they presume that variation is the result of
a single political logic. The New Politics approach expects that governments’ institu-
tional capacity for blame avoidance explains variation in welfare state retrenchment
(Pierson, 2001) and the issue ownership approach argues that social democrats are
politically better able to cut the welfare state across the board (Ross, 2000a). I
find that creating the modern welfare state only bolsters social democratic parties
in some countries and that a separate logic, one dictated by issue deficits, applies in
other countries.
Avenues for Future Research
The identification of two separate worlds of issue politics is a major finding, though
it is a somewhat unsatisfying conclusion. This revelation raises more questions than
it answered. It is up to future studies to identify the causes of national variation
in trust and distrust. Given the similar policy legacies of the Labour Party and the
Social Democratic Party, exploration of the institutional factors of each country may
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uncover the cause for national variation. Expanding the scope of the study beyond
the two cases contained herein would also aid in understanding how widespread these
two models are. The examination of additional cases could help determine if political
institutions cause the differences in public reaction or if the structure of the welfare
state is driving how people react to changes.
Similarly, the finding that each specific welfare policy is treated differently raises
new questions about whether conservative parties can hold issue ownership when they
originally created the welfare program. The issue ownership literature has empha-
sized that social democrats benefit from ownership of welfare but each welfare policy
area is treated differently according to my results. These distinctions leave room for
potential issue ownership by conservative parties on certain welfare policies where
they originally created the program.
A second key area for future research is whether the EU has exercised influence on
countries that were not receiving emergency aid. Financial dependency created lever-
age in countries under both formal MoUs and implicit conditionality. The influence
on countries that were performing better economically is less clear. The extent to
which EU soft power has influenced social policy in European countries with stronger
economies is an interesting question that deserves more attention. If not, suprana-
tional influence would be dualistic, leaving the periphery subject to EU dictates, while
core countries maintain a higher level of sovereignty. This unresolved question will
determine the full scope of a supranational welfare politics.
Conclusion
I want to close this chapter on a more optimistic point. Though the pillars of equality
have started to crack under the weight of neoliberal reforms, I do not believe that
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they are beyond repair. I am reminded of the Japanese practice of kintsugi, where
broken pottery is repaired using gold lacquer as an adhesive, creating something more
beautiful than the original. I have wrote this dissertation in the midst of a year-long
global pandemic and quarantine. In response to this crisis, most governments have
taken extraordinary steps to prevent the worst-case scenario of plague combined with
mass impoverishment. Trillions of dollars have been allocated by the United States
and the European Union toward relief efforts. If there was ever an economic recovery
held together by gold, it has been this one.
This current crisis is a pivotal moment and it is one that is still full of potential.
The lessons learned from the Eurozone crisis lie before us and a future where govern-
ments act on this information is still possible. Innovative policies have been created
to prevent mass unemployment or loss of income and the legacies of these policies
have the potential to transform the welfare state.
What comes after the coronavirus will be the true measure of change. Will govern-
ments slash social spending programs in the name of austerity as they did during the
Eurozone crisis or will a more balanced approach prevail? The scale of the stimulus is
cause for hope. The takeaway from this work should not be that supranational influ-
ence is negative or necessarily harmful. To the contrary, the ability of the European
Union to promote change has tremendous potential for adopting a higher baseline
standard for social policy and industrial policy. The policies that promote equality
are well-known, all that remains is finding the political will to make the change.
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Supplemental Charts and Tables
Table B.1: Party Approval in the UK
Dependent variable:
app cl app cr app rr
(1) (2) (3)
group1 −0.146 0.034 0.047
(0.138) (0.133) (0.145)
group2 0.032 −0.073 0.093
(0.129) (0.124) (0.135)
group3 −0.074 −0.043 −0.145
(0.134) (0.129) (0.140)
age −0.023∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
gender −0.067 −0.034 −0.059
(0.096) (0.093) (0.101)
inc quin −0.047 −0.001 −0.059
(0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
union 0.433∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗ 0.226∗
(0.130) (0.125) (0.136)
pros voteBritish National Party (BNP) −1.161 −1.953∗∗ −2.227∗∗
(1.026) (0.988) (1.075)
pros voteConservative 0.209 1.007∗∗∗ −0.490∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.158) (0.172)
pros voteGreen Party 0.211 −0.957∗∗∗ −1.228∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.229) (0.249)
pros voteLabour 1.337∗∗∗ −0.879∗∗∗ −1.056∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.157) (0.171)
pros voteLiberal Democrat 0.335∗ −0.853∗∗∗ −1.355∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.178) (0.194)
pros voteOther party 0.047 −0.812∗∗∗ −0.829∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.223) (0.243)
pros votePlaid Cymru 0.371 −1.423∗∗∗ −1.693∗∗∗
(0.435) (0.419) (0.456)
pros voteScottish National Party (SNP) −0.116 −1.129∗∗∗ −1.431∗∗∗
(0.317) (0.305) (0.332)
pros voteUnited Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 0.764∗∗∗ 0.128 0.508∗
(0.272) (0.262) (0.285)
Constant 3.052∗∗∗ 2.911∗∗∗ 3.624∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.250) (0.272)
Observations 453 453 453
R2 0.386 0.413 0.216
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.391 0.187
Residual Std. Error (df = 436) 1.006 0.968 1.053
F Statistic (df = 16; 436) 17.155∗∗∗ 19.140∗∗∗ 7.508∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Figure B·1: Average Approval for Retrenchment Proposals
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Table B.2: Approval in Sweden - Full Model
Dependent variable:
app cl app cr app rr
(1) (2) (3)
group1 −0.047 0.192 0.160
(0.140) (0.144) (0.145)
group2 −0.104 0.113 0.020
(0.141) (0.144) (0.145)
group3 −0.060 −0.057 0.018
(0.141) (0.145) (0.146)
age −0.013∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
gender 0.198∗∗ 0.155 0.264∗∗
(0.101) (0.103) (0.104)
inc quin −0.066∗ −0.001 −0.076∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
union 0.190∗ 0.057 −0.011
(0.102) (0.105) (0.105)
pros voteCenter Party 0.755∗∗ 0.706∗∗ −1.174∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.321) (0.323)
pros voteChristian Democrats −0.199 1.105∗∗∗ 0.543∗
(0.277) (0.283) (0.285)
pros voteFeminist Initiative 0.944 0.375 −0.306
(0.665) (0.681) (0.685)
pros voteGreens 1.186∗∗∗ 0.127 −0.772∗∗∗
(0.288) (0.295) (0.297)
pros voteLeft Party 0.653∗∗∗ −0.401∗ −0.828∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.232) (0.233)
pros voteLiberals 0.384 0.676∗ −0.307
(0.393) (0.402) (0.405)
pros voteModerates −0.023 0.910∗∗∗ 0.439∗
(0.227) (0.232) (0.234)
pros voteSocial Democrats 1.594∗∗∗ 0.125 −0.513∗∗
(0.204) (0.209) (0.210)
pros voteSweden Democrats −0.339∗ 0.046 1.712∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.204) (0.206)
Constant 2.958∗∗∗ 2.942∗∗∗ 2.880∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.268) (0.270)
Observations 509 509 509
R2 0.364 0.170 0.463
Adjusted R2 0.343 0.143 0.446
Residual Std. Error (df = 492) 1.103 1.129 1.137
F Statistic (df = 16; 492) 17.584∗∗∗ 6.297∗∗∗ 26.545∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B.3: Experimental Results - Party Approval in the United King-
dom
Dependent variable:
app cl app cr app rr
(1) (2) (3)
group1 0.111 0.065 0.067
(0.166) (0.163) (0.153)
group2 0.239 −0.118 0.156
(0.156) (0.154) (0.145)
group3 0.110 −0.005 −0.032
(0.161) (0.159) (0.149)
Constant 2.265∗∗∗ 2.470∗∗∗ 2.220∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.108) (0.101)
Observations 470 470 470
R2 0.005 0.003 0.004
Adjusted R2 −0.001 −0.004 −0.002
Residual Std. Error (df = 466) 1.252 1.236 1.159
F Statistic (df = 3; 466) 0.779 0.436 0.628
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
136
Table B.4: Experimental Results - Party Approval in Sweden
Dependent variable:
app cl app cr app rr
(1) (2) (3)
group1 −0.156 0.270∗ 0.213
(0.170) (0.153) (0.191)
group2 −0.197 0.213 0.031
(0.171) (0.153) (0.192)
group3 −0.291∗ 0.071 0.205
(0.171) (0.153) (0.192)
Constant 2.921∗∗∗ 2.449∗∗∗ 2.756∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.108) (0.136)
Observations 509 509 509
R2 0.006 0.008 0.004
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.002 −0.002
Residual Std. Error (df = 505) 1.361 1.218 1.528
F Statistic (df = 3; 505) 1.011 1.331 0.686




The underlying datasets, code, and calculations are available by request to the cor-
responding author.
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